Meet.bot MCP MCP Server
https://mcp.meet.bot/
Remote
v1.3.0
Published by mcp.meet.bot — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
AI-native scheduling and booking: check availability, book meetings, share links.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_page_info]) co-exist with external-action tools ([set_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_page_info] → sinks [set_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_page_info → set_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "set_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "set_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool set_webhook · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 8
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
delete_webhooknetwork egressget_page_infoingests untrusted inputset_webhooknetwork egressbook_meetingno sensitive capabilityget_available_slotsno sensitive capabilityget_scheduling_pagesno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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