Manimgl MCP Server
mcp-manimgl
PyPI
v0.1.2
Published by dclavijo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_manimgl/adapters/manim_adapter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_manimgl/adapters/manim_adapter.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_manimgl/adapters/manim_adapter.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_manimgl/utils/audio_mixer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_manimgl/utils/audio_mixer.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_manimgl/utils/audio_mixer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_manimgl/utils/dependency_checker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_manimgl/utils/dependency_checker.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp_manimgl/utils/dependency_checker.py
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_3d_objectno sensitive capabilityadd_arrowno sensitive capabilityadd_background_musicno sensitive capabilityadd_braceno sensitive capabilityadd_circleno sensitive capabilityadd_coordinate_systemno sensitive capabilityadd_custom_codeno sensitive capabilityadd_decimal_numberno sensitive capabilityadd_dotno sensitive capabilityadd_function_graphno sensitive capabilityadd_labeled_pointno sensitive capabilityadd_lineno sensitive capabilityadd_matrixno sensitive capabilityadd_narrationno sensitive capabilityadd_number_lineno sensitive capabilityadd_parametric_curveno sensitive capabilityadd_polygonno sensitive capabilityadd_rectangleno sensitive capabilityadd_squareno sensitive capabilityadd_texno sensitive capabilityadd_textno sensitive capabilityadd_vectorno sensitive capabilityadd_waitno sensitive capabilityalign_tono sensitive capabilityanimate_fade_inno sensitive capabilityanimate_fade_outno sensitive capabilityanimate_groupno sensitive capabilityanimate_growno sensitive capabilityanimate_indicateno sensitive capabilityanimate_move_along_pathno sensitive capabilityanimate_rotateno sensitive capabilityanimate_scaleno sensitive capabilityanimate_set_colorno sensitive capabilityanimate_shiftno sensitive capabilityanimate_transformno sensitive capabilityanimate_writeno sensitive capabilityaudio_durationno sensitive capabilityclear_sceneno sensitive capabilitycreate_sceneno sensitive capabilitygenerate_scene_scriptno sensitive capabilityget_render_resultno sensitive capabilityget_render_statusno sensitive capabilityget_scene_infono sensitive capabilitymove_tono sensitive capabilitynext_tono sensitive capabilityrender_sceneno sensitive capabilityrestore_stateno sensitive capabilityrotateno sensitive capabilitysave_frameno sensitive capabilitysave_stateno sensitive capabilityscaleno sensitive capabilityset_camerano sensitive capabilityset_colorno sensitive capabilityset_configno sensitive capabilityset_opacityno sensitive capabilityshiftno sensitive capabilityverify_scene_overlapsno sensitive capabilityverify_videono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-manimgl --online --registry pypiMore in Learning & Documentation
Security scan results for the Agentmail MCP server.
Security scan results for the Alfahq MCP server.
Security scan results for the Alpine MCP server.
Security scan results for the Atag MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aurais Mcp Research Reader MCP server.
Security scan results for the Bookstack MCP server.