Raw scan report

Interactive Terminal — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "mcp-interactive-terminal",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "mcp-interactive-terminal"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "mcp-interactive-terminal"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 82,
    "threatScore": 89,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 9.45,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 1.2,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.5,
        "appliedPenalty": 3.15
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "heuristic",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.4,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/terminal.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/terminal.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/terminal.js"
      },
      "evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { detectPromptPattern, endsWithPrompt } from \"./utils/output-detector.js\"",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/terminal.js",
        "line": 11,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/create-session.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/create-session.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/create-session.js"
      },
      "evidence": "escribe(\"The command to spawn (e.g., 'python3', 'bash', 'psql')\"), args: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe(\"Ar",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/tools/create-session.js",
        "line": 4,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/send-control.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/send-control.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/send-control.js"
      },
      "evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { CONTROL_KEYS } from \"../types.js\"; import { sanitize } from \"../utils/s",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/tools/send-control.js",
        "line": 2,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/terminal.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/terminal.ts:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/terminal.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "ildProcess } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { TerminalWrapper } from \"./types.js\"; import { detectPromptPattern,",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/terminal.ts",
        "line": 12,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/create-session.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/create-session.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/tools/create-session.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "escribe(\"The command to spawn (e.g., 'python3', 'bash', 'psql')\"), args: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe(\"Argu",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/tools/create-session.ts",
        "line": 7,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/send-control.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/send-control.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/tools/send-control.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import type { SessionManager } from \"../session-manager.js\"; import type { Serve",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/tools/send-control.ts",
        "line": 2,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/types.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/types.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/types.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "ildProcess } from \"node:child_process\"; // --- Configuration --- export interface ServerConfig { maxSessions: number",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/types.ts",
        "line": 1,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/send-control.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/send-control.js:13`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/send-control.js"
      },
      "evidence": "y { const out = execSync(`pgrep -P ${pid}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", timeout: 2000 }).trim(); if (!out)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/tools/send-control.js",
        "line": 13,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/send-control.ts)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/send-control.ts:16`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/tools/send-control.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "try { const out = execSync(`pgrep -P ${pid}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", timeout: 2000 }).trim(); if (!out) return [",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "src/tools/send-control.ts",
        "line": 16,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
      "title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "\"mcp-interactive-terminal\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
      "remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "mcp-interactive-terminal"
      },
      "evidence": "node -e \"try{require('fs').chmodSync(require('path').join(require.resolve('node-pty'),'..','..','prebuilds',process.platform+'-'+process.arch,'spawn-helper'),0o",
      "owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
        "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
      ],
      "data": {
        "scripts": [
          "postinstall"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "create_session",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "send_command",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "read_output",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_sessions",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "close_session",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "send_control",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "confirm_dangerous_command",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "46c39b58bc4e94a6fcb49fd76ee2ee1308c6c4fb511c39bc70a1c5bf0a848651",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 7,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 7,
      "medium": 2,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}