GitHub (mcp-github-server) (pblarismendi) MCP Server

mcp-github-server npm v1.0.2

Published by pblarismendi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Lists GitHub repositories, issues, pull requests, and more; compatible with macOS, Linux, and Windows.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "create_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow create_webhook

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "update_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "update_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow update_webhook

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([create_webhook, update_webhook]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, ping_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [create_webhook, update_webhook] → sinks [create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, ping_webhook]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow create_webhook → create_issue

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url

Tools 40

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive data
  • update_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive data
  • create_issuenetwork egress
  • create_pull_requestnetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • ping_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_issue_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_pull_request_reviewno sensitive capability
  • close_issueno sensitive capability
  • close_pull_requestno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
  • compare_commitsno sensitive capability
  • create_releaseno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • get_commitno sensitive capability
  • get_file_contentno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_releaseno sensitive capability
  • get_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_user_infono sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • list_branchesno sensitive capability
  • list_commitsno sensitive capability
  • list_issue_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • list_pull_request_reviewsno sensitive capability
  • list_pull_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_releasesno sensitive capability
  • list_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • merge_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • Mis Repositoriosno sensitive capability
  • protect_branchno sensitive capability
  • search_codeno sensitive capability
  • search_commitsno sensitive capability
  • search_issuesno sensitive capability
  • search_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • search_usersno sensitive capability
  • update_issueno sensitive capability
  • update_pull_requestno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 3

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.2 latest A 93/100 5 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-github-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of GitHub (mcp-github-server) 27

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →

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