mcp-github-server
npm
v1.0.2
Published by pblarismendi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Lists GitHub repositories, issues, pull requests, and more; compatible with macOS, Linux, and Windows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow create_webhook
Tool "update_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow update_webhook
Tools that read sensitive data ([create_webhook, update_webhook]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, ping_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [create_webhook, update_webhook] → sinks [create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, ping_webhook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow create_webhook → create_issue
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tool "update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive dataupdate_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive datacreate_issuenetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressping_webhooknetwork egressadd_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_pull_request_reviewno sensitive capabilityclose_issueno sensitive capabilityclose_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitycompare_commitsno sensitive capabilitycreate_releaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_tagno sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_releaseno sensitive capabilityget_repositoryno sensitive capabilityget_user_infono sensitive capabilityget_webhookno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_reviewsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityMis Repositoriosno sensitive capabilityprotect_branchno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_commitsno sensitive capabilitysearch_issuesno sensitive capabilitysearch_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-github-server --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →
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