Raw scan report

Gdb — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.9.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "mcp-gdb",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "mcp-gdb"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "mcp-gdb"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 94,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec",
      "sensitive-source"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
      "title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([gdb_load_core]) and tools that can send data out ([gdb_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
      "remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "gdb_load_core → gdb_command"
      },
      "evidence": "sources [gdb_load_core] → sinks [gdb_command]",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "sources": [
          "gdb_load_core"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "gdb_command"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
      "title": "Tool \"gdb_command\" exposes command/code execution",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tool \"gdb_command\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
      "remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "gdb_command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "build/index.js"
      },
      "evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as readline from 'readline'; import * as path from 'path'; // Map to st",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "build/index.js",
        "line": 5,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/index.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "n, ChildProcess } from 'child_process'; import * as readline from 'readline'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "src/index.ts",
        "line": 10,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
      "title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"gdb_command\"",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"gdb_command\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
      "remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "gdb_command",
        "field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "param": "command"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
      "title": "Mutating tool \"gdb_command\" declares no destructiveHint",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "Tool \"gdb_command\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
      "remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "gdb_command"
      },
      "data": {
        "tags": [
          "code-exec"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [
    {
      "id": "flow-1",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "untrustedInput": [],
      "sensitiveSource": [
        "gdb_load_core"
      ],
      "externalSink": [
        "gdb_command"
      ],
      "selfContained": false,
      "path": [
        "gdb_load_core",
        "gdb_command"
      ],
      "pathWired": false,
      "description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: gdb_load_core → gdb_command."
    }
  ],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "gdb_start",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_load",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_command",
      "tags": [
        "code-exec"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "code-exec": [
          "parameter \"command\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_terminate",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_list_sessions",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_attach",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_load_core",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"dump\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_set_breakpoint",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_continue",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_step",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_next",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_finish",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_backtrace",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_print",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_examine",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_info_registers",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "gdb_list_source",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "d74d842973f693650a46da73cd9b05f4dadf332a138392e4a66d936e3a3b6ce7",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 17,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 4,
      "medium": 1,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}