For Microsoft Fabric Analytics MCP Server
mcp-for-microsoft-fabric-analytics
npm
v2.0.1
Published by santhoshravindran7 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Microsoft Fabric Analytics with Synapse-to-Fabric migration - enables LLMs to access, analyze, and migrate workloads to Microsoft Fabric
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/auth-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/auth-client.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export var
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/auth-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:920`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const command = 'az account get-access-token --resource "https://ap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/migration/capacity-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/capacity-tools.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // Capacity SKU specifications based on Microsoft documentation const CAPACITY_S
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/capacity-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/migration/fabric-provisioner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/fabric-provisioner.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); const execA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/fabric-provisioner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/migration/orchestrator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/orchestrator.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export class MigrationOrchestrator { /** * Fetch Fabric pricing from Az
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/orchestrator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/migration/spark-pool-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/spark-pool-tools.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // Synapse node size to vCore mapping const NODE_SIZE_VCORES = { 'Small': 4,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/spark-pool-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/migration/synapse-discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/synapse-discovery.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); export clas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/synapse-discovery.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1996`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://api.fabric.microsoft.com/v1/workspaces/${workspaceId}/notebooks`, { m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/migration/capacity-tools.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/migration/capacity-tools.js:50`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.fabric.microsoft.com/v1/capacities', { headers: { 'Authorization'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/migration/capacity-tools.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/auth-client.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/auth-client.js:189`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > { exec(`start ${authUrl}`, (error) => { if (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/auth-client.js
Tools 78
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze-fabric-run-performanceno sensitive capabilityanalyze-livy-execution-historyno sensitive capabilityanalyze-livy-session-logsno sensitive capabilityanalyze-livy-statement-performanceno sensitive capabilitycancel-spark-applicationno sensitive capabilitycheck-fabric-auth-statusno sensitive capabilitycreate-fabric-dataflowno sensitive capabilitycreate-fabric-itemno sensitive capabilitycreate-fabric-notebookno sensitive capabilitycreate-livy-batchno sensitive capability
Show 68 more tools ↓
create-livy-sessionno sensitive capabilitycreate-spark-job-instanceno sensitive capabilitydelete-fabric-dataflowno sensitive capabilitydelete-fabric-itemno sensitive capabilitydelete-fabric-notebookno sensitive capabilitydelete-livy-sessionno sensitive capabilityexecute-fabric-notebookno sensitive capabilityexecute-livy-statementno sensitive capabilityexecute-spark-job-definitionno sensitive capabilityfabric_assign_capacityno sensitive capabilityfabric_assign_workspace_to_capacityno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_fabric_spark_poolsno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_lakehouseno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_workspaceno sensitive capabilityfabric_discover_synapse_workspaceno sensitive capabilityfabric_find_workspaceno sensitive capabilityfabric_get_synapse_spark_poolsno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_capacitiesno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_capacity_workspacesno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_synapse_workspacesno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_workspacesno sensitive capabilityfabric_migrate_spark_pools_to_fabricno sensitive capabilityfabric_migrate_synapse_to_fabricno sensitive capabilityfabric_provision_notebooksno sensitive capabilityfabric_recommend_fabric_capacityno sensitive capabilityfabric_synapse_compute_spendno sensitive capabilityfabric_synapse_workspace_detailsno sensitive capabilityfabric_transform_notebooksno sensitive capabilityfabric_unassign_workspace_from_capacityno sensitive capabilitygenerate-dataflow-monitoring-reportno sensitive capabilityget-fabric-dataflowno sensitive capabilityget-fabric-itemno sensitive capabilityget-fabric-item-runno sensitive capabilityget-fabric-notebookno sensitive capabilityget-fabric-notebook-definitionno sensitive capabilityget-job-statusno sensitive capabilityget-lakehouse-spark-applicationsno sensitive capabilityget-livy-batchno sensitive capabilityget-livy-sessionno sensitive capabilityget-livy-statementno sensitive capabilityget-livy-statement-enhancedno sensitive capabilityget-monitoring-session-statusno sensitive capabilityget-notebook-spark-application-detailsno sensitive capabilityget-notebook-spark-application-jobsno sensitive capabilityget-notebook-spark-applicationsno sensitive capabilityget-spark-application-detailsno sensitive capabilityget-spark-job-definition-applicationsno sensitive capabilityget-spark-job-instance-statusno sensitive capabilityget-spark-monitoring-dashboardno sensitive capabilityget-workspace-spark-applicationsno sensitive capabilitylist-fabric-dataflowsno sensitive capabilitylist-fabric-item-runsno sensitive capabilitylist-fabric-itemsno sensitive capabilitylist-fabric-notebooksno sensitive capabilitylist-fabric-run-subactivitiesno sensitive capabilitylist-livy-sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist-monitoring-sessionsno sensitive capabilitymonitor-dataflow-statusno sensitive capabilitymonitor-fabric-runs-dashboardno sensitive capabilitymonitor-workspace-dataflowsno sensitive capabilityperform-dataflow-health-checkno sensitive capabilityrun-fabric-notebookno sensitive capabilitystart-continuous-dataflow-monitoringno sensitive capabilitystop-monitoring-sessionno sensitive capabilitysubmit-spark-jobno sensitive capabilityupdate-fabric-dataflowno sensitive capabilityupdate-fabric-itemno sensitive capabilityupdate-fabric-notebookno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (78 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
B 87/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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