Raw scan report

Edge Tts — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "mcp-edge-tts",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "mcp-edge-tts"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "mcp-edge-tts"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 82,
    "threatScore": 89,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 11.03,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.5,
        "appliedPenalty": 3.15
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.25,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.58
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (3 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/client.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/client.py:1446`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/client.py"
      },
      "evidence": "variables or ~/.netrc file if present. \"\"\" return self._trust_env @property def",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/client.py",
        "line": 1446,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/helpers.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/helpers.py:215`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/helpers.py"
      },
      "evidence": "\"trying to look for .netrc file: %s\", e, ) return None netrc_",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/helpers.py",
        "line": 215,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
      "title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py:3139`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py"
      },
      "evidence": "return 1 return eval(sizestring) FormulaCommand.types += [HybridFunction] def math2html(formula): \"Conve",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py",
        "line": 3139,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/attr/_make.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/attr/_make.py:227`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/attr/_make.py"
      },
      "evidence": ", filename, \"exec\") eval(bytecode, globs, locs) def _linecache_and_compile( script: str, filename: str,",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/attr/_make.py",
        "line": 227,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/recompiler.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/recompiler.py:78`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/recompiler.py"
      },
      "evidence": "(self): flags = eval(self.flags, G_FLAGS) fields_expr = [c_field.as_field_python_expr()",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/recompiler.py",
        "line": 78,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py:3139`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py"
      },
      "evidence": "return 1 return eval(sizestring) FormulaCommand.types += [HybridFunction] def math2html(formula): \"Conve",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/math2html.py",
        "line": 3139,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py:1485`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py"
      },
      "evidence": "u are familiar with how eval() and exec() work). The search order is locals first, then globals. - If",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py",
        "line": 1485,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/_backends/_trio.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/_backends/_trio.py:1106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/_backends/_trio.py"
      },
      "evidence": "stderr, shell=True, **kwargs, ) else: process = await tr",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/_backends/_trio.py",
        "line": 1106,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/pkgconfig.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/pkgconfig.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/pkgconfig.py"
      },
      "evidence": ") try: pc = subprocess.Popen(a, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) except EnvironmentError",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/pkgconfig.py",
        "line": 33,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/setuptools_ext.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/setuptools_ext.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/setuptools_ext.py"
      },
      "evidence": ", filename, 'exec') exec(code, glob, glob) def add_cffi_module(dist, mod_spec): from cffi.api import FFI",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/setuptools_ext.py",
        "line": 26,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/_termui_impl.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/_termui_impl.py:454`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/_termui_impl.py"
      },
      "evidence": "color = True c = subprocess.Popen( [str(cmd_path)] + cmd_params, shell=False, stdin=subpr",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/_termui_impl.py",
        "line": 454,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/shell_completion.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/shell_completion.py:320`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/shell_completion.py"
      },
      "evidence": "e: output = subprocess.run( [bash_exe, \"--norc\", \"-c\", 'echo \"${BASH_VERSION}\"'],",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/click/shell_completion.py",
        "line": 320,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/tex2mathml_extern.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/tex2mathml_extern.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/tex2mathml_extern.py"
      },
      "evidence": "ligned}') result = subprocess.run(args, input=math_code, capture_output=True, text=True",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/docutils/utils/math/tex2mathml_extern.py",
        "line": 73,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py:1485`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py"
      },
      "evidence": "iar with how eval() and exec() work). The search order is locals first, then globals. - If no dict arg",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/typing_extensions.py",
        "line": 1485,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/verifier.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/verifier.py:151`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/verifier.py"
      },
      "evidence": "pkg = __import__(self.ext_package, None, None, ['__doc__']) except ImportError:",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/cffi/verifier.py",
        "line": 151,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/cookiejar.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/cookiejar.py:133`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/cookiejar.py"
      },
      "evidence": "self._cookies = pickle.load(f) def clear(self, predicate: Optional[ClearCookiePredicate] = None) -> None:",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/aiohttp/cookiejar.py",
        "line": 133,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_interpreter.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_interpreter.py:130`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_interpreter.py"
      },
      "evidence": ": res = pickle.loads(res) if is_exception: raise res return re",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_interpreter.py",
        "line": 130,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_process.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_process.py:94`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_process.py"
      },
      "evidence": "m exc retval = pickle.loads(pickled_response) if status == b\"EXCEPTION\": assert isinstance(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "venv_win/Lib/site-packages/anyio/to_process.py",
        "line": 94,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
      "title": "Package has no license",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"mcp-edge-tts\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "mcp-edge-tts"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "speak",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_available_voices",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_config",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "aaeea92be4ef8d68d4df0b6af661d7b1307fbd5e400eb61e9616a874700e0c57",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 3,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 14,
      "medium": 4,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 1
    }
  }
}