Discord Bridge MCP Server
mcp-discord-bridge
npm
v1.2.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server that lets AI assistants control Discord servers via discord.js
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_channel_messages, get_forum_post]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, create_webhook, send_webhook_message, edit_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_channel_messages, get_forum_post] → sinks [send_message, create_webhook, send_webhook_message, edit_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_channel_messages → send_message
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressedit_webhooknetwork egressget_channel_messagesingests untrusted inputget_forum_postingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egresssend_webhook_messagenetwork egressadd_multiple_reactionsno sensitive capabilityadd_reactionno sensitive capabilityarchive_threadno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
assign_roleno sensitive capabilityban_memberno sensitive capabilitycreate_categoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_channelno sensitive capabilitycreate_forum_postno sensitive capabilitycreate_roleno sensitive capabilitycreate_threadno sensitive capabilitydelete_channelno sensitive capabilitydelete_forum_postno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilitydelete_roleno sensitive capabilitydelete_threadno sensitive capabilityedit_messageno sensitive capabilityedit_roleno sensitive capabilityget_memberno sensitive capabilityjoin_threadno sensitive capabilitykick_memberno sensitive capabilitylist_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_forum_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_guildsno sensitive capabilitylist_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_rolesno sensitive capabilitylist_threadsno sensitive capabilitymove_channelno sensitive capabilityremove_reactionno sensitive capabilityremove_roleno sensitive capabilityrename_channelno sensitive capabilityreply_to_forum_postno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysend_dmno sensitive capabilityset_nicknameno sensitive capabilitytimeout_memberno sensitive capabilityunarchive_threadno sensitive capabilityunban_memberno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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