Delightloop — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-delightloop",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-delightloop"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-delightloop"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([recipient_list, linkedin_profile_get, gift_list]) co-exist with external-action tools ([webhook_create, webhook_get, webhook_delete]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "recipient_list → webhook_create"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [recipient_list, linkedin_profile_get, gift_list] → sinks [webhook_create, webhook_get, webhook_delete]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"recipient_list",
"linkedin_profile_get",
"gift_list"
],
"sinks": [
"webhook_create",
"webhook_get",
"webhook_delete"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"recipient_list",
"linkedin_profile_get",
"gift_list"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"webhook_create",
"webhook_get",
"webhook_delete"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "contact_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contact_bulk_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contact_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contact_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contact_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recipient_list",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "recipient_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "campaign_launch_recipients",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "campaign_launch_all",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recipient_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linkedin_profile_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "work_email_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gift_list",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gift_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "email_bulk_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "campaign_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "campaign_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "campaign_add_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_create",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_get",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "webhook_delete",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bbd09924ba37c7266ce7804ad1653c53f7e5013b04cf695f8245a83ccb29289b",
"stats": {
"tools": 23,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}