Curl Downloader MCP Server
mcp-curl-downloader
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 33.6 = 66. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −31.5 | Self-contained exfiltration primitive: "download_file" MTC-FLOW-001 | exfiltration |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 66 − 15 = 51. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −5 | publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Grade capped: a critical finding is present → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Self-contained exfiltration primitive: "download_file"MTC-FLOW-001
Tool "download_file" holds all three trifecta roles by itself (untrusted-input + sensitive-source + external-sink). A single call can pull attacker-controlled content, read private data, and exfiltrate it — no composition required.
Fix: Split responsibilities across separate, individually-consented tools; never combine untrusted input, secret reads, and egress in one tool.
Location: flow download_file
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "download_file"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "download_file" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool download_file · inputSchema.properties.url
low Unconstrained path parameter "dest_path" on "download_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "download_file" takes a path parameter "dest_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool download_file · inputSchema.properties.dest_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "download_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "download_file" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool download_file · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"mcp-curl-downloader" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package mcp-curl-downloader
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
F 51/100 | 5 | 1.7.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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