Comfy Ui Builder MCP Server
mcp-comfy-ui-builder
npm
v2.4.1
Published by mit9 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for ComfyUI: seed knowledge base (62+ nodes), 50+ tools for workflow building, real-time execution (WebSocket), batch/chain, model management. For Cursor and Claude.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/manager-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/manager-cli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/manager-cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/manager-cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/manager-cli.js:57`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const out = execSync(`netstat -ano | findstr :${port}`, { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/manager-cli.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "install_model"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "install_model" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool install_model · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_all_outputsingests untrusted inputdownload_by_filenameingests untrusted inputdownload_outputingests untrusted inputget_last_outputingests untrusted inputinstall_modelingests untrusted inputprepare_image_for_workflowingests untrusted inputadd_nodeno sensitive capabilityapply_templateno sensitive capabilitybuild_workflowno sensitive capabilitycheck_compatibilityno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
check_model_existsno sensitive capabilitycheck_workflow_modelsno sensitive capabilityclear_queueno sensitive capabilityconnect_nodesno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete_queue_itemsno sensitive capabilitydiscover_nodes_liveno sensitive capabilityexecute_batchno sensitive capabilityexecute_chainno sensitive capabilityexecute_workflowno sensitive capabilityexecute_workflow_streamno sensitive capabilityexecute_workflow_syncno sensitive capabilityfinalize_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_error_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_execution_progressno sensitive capabilityget_execution_statusno sensitive capabilityget_generation_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget_historyno sensitive capabilityget_model_infono sensitive capabilityget_node_infono sensitive capabilityget_node_inputsno sensitive capabilityget_node_outputsno sensitive capabilityget_system_resourcesno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_jsonno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_modelsno sensitive capabilityinsert_macrono sensitive capabilityinstall_custom_nodeno sensitive capabilityinterrupt_executionno sensitive capabilitylist_macrosno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_node_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_node_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_outputsno sensitive capabilitylist_pluginsno sensitive capabilitylist_queueno sensitive capabilitylist_saved_workflowsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilityload_workflowno sensitive capabilityreload_comfyuino sensitive capabilityreload_pluginsno sensitive capabilityremove_nodeno sensitive capabilitysave_workflowno sensitive capabilitysearch_nodesno sensitive capabilityset_node_inputno sensitive capabilitysuggest_nodesno sensitive capabilitysuggest_template_for_checkpointno sensitive capabilitysync_nodes_to_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityvalidate_template_paramsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_workflowno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.4.1 latest |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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