Colombia Hub MCP Server
mcp-colombia-hub
npm
v1.3.1
Published by manuelariasfz — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Colombian products, travel and finance — MercadoLibre, Booking.com hotels & flights, CDTs, loans and savings accounts
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/booking.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/booking.js:40`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await axios.get("https://www.booking.com/searchresults.html", { params, header
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/booking.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/inmuebles.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/inmuebles.js:102`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await axios.get("https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search", { params: { q: query, co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/inmuebles.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/mercadolibre.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/mercadolibre.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await axios.post("https://api.mercadolibre.com/oauth/token", null, { params: { grant_type:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/mercadolibre.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/trabajo.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/trabajo.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await axios.get("https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search", { params: { q: query, co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/trabajo.js
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
finanzas_comparar_cdtno sensitive capabilityfinanzas_comparar_cuentasno sensitive capabilityfinanzas_simular_creditono sensitive capabilityinmuebles_buscarno sensitive capabilitymcp_estadono sensitive capabilitymcp_lista_verificadosno sensitive capabilitymcp_registrarno sensitive capabilityml_buscar_productosno sensitive capabilityml_detalle_productono sensitive capabilitysoulprint_statusno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
trabajo_aplicarno sensitive capabilityviajes_buscar_hotelno sensitive capabilityviajes_buscar_vuelosno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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