Cohesity MCP Server

mcp-cohesity npm v2.0.0

Published by dvermagithub — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Cohesity DataProtect — 108 tools across 23 categories for source registration, backup, recovery, retention/WORM, archival, monitoring, reporting, identity, audit, antivirus, KMS, and clones

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: browse_snapshot_files → list_infected_files → create_notification_rule. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow browse_snapshot_files → list_infected_files → create_notification_rule

Tools 108

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • browse_snapshot_filesingests untrusted input
  • create_notification_rulenetwork egress
  • list_infected_filesreads sensitive data
  • add_aws_kmsno sensitive capability
  • add_kmip_kmsno sensitive capability
  • cancel_protection_runno sensitive capability
  • cancel_recovery_taskno sensitive capability
  • check_icap_connectionno sensitive capability
  • clone_viewno sensitive capability
  • create_ad_userno sensitive capability
Show 98 more tools ↓
  • create_antivirus_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_external_target_awsno sensitive capability
  • create_external_target_azureno sensitive capability
  • create_local_userno sensitive capability
  • create_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • create_protection_policyno sensitive capability
  • create_roleno sensitive capability
  • create_tiering_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_antivirus_groupno sensitive capability
  • delete_clone_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_external_targetno sensitive capability
  • delete_kmsno sensitive capability
  • delete_notification_ruleno sensitive capability
  • delete_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • delete_protection_policyno sensitive capability
  • delete_roleno sensitive capability
  • delete_snapshotno sensitive capability
  • delete_tiering_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_usersno sensitive capability
  • extend_snapshot_retentionno sensitive capability
  • generate_capacity_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_failed_backups_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_protection_summary_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_antivirus_groupno sensitive capability
  • get_archival_transfer_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_cluster_infono sensitive capability
  • get_cluster_statsno sensitive capability
  • get_cluster_storage_statsno sensitive capability
  • get_external_targetno sensitive capability
  • get_external_target_encryption_keyno sensitive capability
  • get_protected_objects_trend_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • get_protection_heatmapno sensitive capability
  • get_protection_runno sensitive capability
  • get_protection_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_recovery_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_recovery_taskno sensitive capability
  • get_replication_backlogno sensitive capability
  • get_replication_clustersno sensitive capability
  • get_replication_data_trendno sensitive capability
  • get_replication_objectsno sensitive capability
  • get_sourceno sensitive capability
  • get_sources_jobs_summary_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_tiering_taskno sensitive capability
  • get_userno sensitive capability
  • get_workload_statsno sensitive capability
  • join_active_directoryno sensitive capability
  • leave_active_directoryno sensitive capability
  • list_active_directoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_alertsno sensitive capability
  • list_antivirus_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_audit_log_actionsno sensitive capability
  • list_audit_log_entity_typesno sensitive capability
  • list_audit_logsno sensitive capability
  • list_clone_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_external_targetsno sensitive capability
  • list_kms_configurationsno sensitive capability
  • list_notification_rulesno sensitive capability
  • list_objectsno sensitive capability
  • list_protection_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_protection_policiesno sensitive capability
  • list_protection_runsno sensitive capability
  • list_recovery_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_rolesno sensitive capability
  • list_snapshotsno sensitive capability
  • list_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_storage_domainsno sensitive capability
  • list_tiering_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • pause_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • recover_filesno sensitive capability
  • recover_vmno sensitive capability
  • refresh_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_aws_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_azure_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_m365_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_nas_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_physical_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_s3_compatible_sourceno sensitive capability
  • register_vmware_sourceno sensitive capability
  • resolve_alertno sensitive capability
  • resume_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • run_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • run_tiering_taskno sensitive capability
  • search_filesno sensitive capability
  • search_objectsno sensitive capability
  • set_snapshot_datalockno sensitive capability
  • set_snapshot_legal_holdno sensitive capability
  • unregister_sourceno sensitive capability
  • update_antivirus_groupno sensitive capability
  • update_kmsno sensitive capability
  • update_notification_ruleno sensitive capability
  • update_protection_groupno sensitive capability
  • update_protection_policyno sensitive capability
  • update_roleno sensitive capability
  • update_source_registrationno sensitive capability
  • update_tiering_task_stateno sensitive capability
  • update_userno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.0.0 latest A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-cohesity --online

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