Codebase Index — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-codebase-index",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-codebase-index"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-codebase-index"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_codebase_index/git_tracker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_codebase_index/git_tracker.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_codebase_index/git_tracker.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--is-inside-work-tree\"], cwd=root_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_codebase_index/git_tracker.py",
"line": 43,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"get_file_dependencies\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_file_dependencies\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_file_dependencies",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"get_file_dependents\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_file_dependents\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_file_dependents",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/benchmark.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/benchmark.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/benchmark.py"
},
"evidence": "']} from {url}...\") subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"clone\", \"--depth\", \"1\", url, project[\"path\"]], capture_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/benchmark.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/runner.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/runner.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "benchmarks/runner.py"
},
"evidence": "epo} (shallow)...\") subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"clone\", \"--depth\", \"1\", DJANGO_CLONE_URL, target_repo],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "benchmarks/runner.py",
"line": 51,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_incremental.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_incremental.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_incremental.py"
},
"evidence": "ry() as tmpdir: subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\"], cwd=tmpdir, capture_output=True, check=True) subprocess.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_incremental.py",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_project_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_structure_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_function_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_class_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_classes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_imports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dependencies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dependents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_change_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_call_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_dependencies",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_dependents",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reindex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_usage_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "aa678c8f6a242a4c937046ae84562b33d81b6f3d8d0518c2b6f8dc5c42fd2ef0",
"stats": {
"tools": 18,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}