Coaia Sequential Thinking MCP Server
mcp-coaia-sequential-thinking
PyPI
v0.3.13
Published by miadisabelle — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
CoAiA's Structural Core: Guiding Intelligent Agents with Foundational Creative Thinking
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (debug_mcp_connection.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`debug_mcp_connection.py:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: r process process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-u", server_path], # -u for unbuffered output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server debug_mcp_connection.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (llms/sync_llms_ordered.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`llms/sync_llms_ordered.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: . """ process = subprocess.run( ["python3", os.path.join(LLMS_DIR, "transform_llms_content.py")],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server llms/sync_llms_ordered.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp_coaia_sequential_thinking/wrapper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp_coaia_sequential_thinking/wrapper.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: args try: subprocess.run(command, check=True) except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: print
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp_coaia_sequential_thinking/wrapper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (test_creative_orientation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test_creative_orientation.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=".") if result.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_creative_orientation.py
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
adjust_exploration_balanceno sensitive capabilityadvance_creative_emergenceno sensitive capabilityadvance_thinking_chainno sensitive capabilitycheck_agent_creative_orientationno sensitive capabilitycheck_integration_statusno sensitive capabilityclear_historyno sensitive capabilityconduct_novelty_searchno sensitive capabilitycreate_agent_collaborationno sensitive capabilitycreate_consensus_decisionno sensitive capabilitydiscover_emergent_opportunitiesno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
establish_system_goalno sensitive capabilityevaluate_resilient_connectionno sensitive capabilityexport_sessionno sensitive capabilitygenerate_active_pause_draftsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_active_thinking_chainsno sensitive capabilityget_consensus_decision_statusno sensitive capabilityget_constitutional_audit_trailno sensitive capabilityget_goal_progressno sensitive capabilityget_lattice_statusno sensitive capabilityget_task_statusno sensitive capabilityget_thinking_chain_statusno sensitive capabilityimport_sessionno sensitive capabilityinitialize_polycentric_latticeno sensitive capabilityinitiate_creative_emergenceno sensitive capabilityinitiate_sequential_thinkingno sensitive capabilityintegrate_emergent_possibilityno sensitive capabilitylist_constitutional_principlesno sensitive capabilitymake_constitutional_decisionno sensitive capabilityprocess_thoughtno sensitive capabilityprovide_human_responseno sensitive capabilityquery_agent_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityrequest_human_consultationno sensitive capabilityrun_full_analysis_chainno sensitive capabilitysubmit_agent_taskno sensitive capabilitysynthesize_thinking_chainno sensitive capabilityvalidate_constitutional_complianceno sensitive capabilityvalidate_thought_contentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.13 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-coaia-sequential-thinking --online --registry pypiMore in Learning & Documentation
stdio compatibility bridge for the hosted AgentMail MCP server
MCP server for Alfa documentation retrieval
MCP server providing Alpine.js documentation and reference
Search the official Astro framework documentation.
MCP server providing ATAG 2.0 (Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines) guidance for authoring tool developers
Aurais Research Reader as an MCP server — paste a paper or article, get a structured read with verbatim-verified quotes + a signed Vorion proof chain (via @vorionsys/aurais-core).