mcp-cn-commerce
PyPI
v0.1.5
Published by tonywang-hub — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Chinese e-commerce platform MCP servers — let AI agents read merchant business data (Ocean Engine, Douyin Shop, JD.com, Taobao, Pinduoduo)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`shared/cli.py:251`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, cwd=str(_REPO_ROOT)) sys.exit(result.returncode) except
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server shared/cli.py
In the server's implementation (`shared/cli.py:185`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: REPO_ROOT)) __import__(info["module"]) result["importable"] = True except Exception as e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server shared/cli.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_datareads sensitive dataget_after_sale_detailno sensitive capabilityget_after_sale_listno sensitive capabilityget_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_bill_listno sensitive capabilityget_feige_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_increment_ordersno sensitive capabilityget_inventoryno sensitive capabilityget_live_datano sensitive capabilityget_logistics_trackingno sensitive capabilityget_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_order_detailno sensitive capabilityget_order_listno sensitive capabilityget_price_infono sensitive capabilityget_product_detailno sensitive capabilityget_product_listno sensitive capabilityget_refund_detailno sensitive capabilityget_refund_listno sensitive capabilityget_review_detailno sensitive capabilityget_review_listno sensitive capabilityget_seller_infono sensitive capabilityget_shop_infono sensitive capabilityget_shop_scoreno sensitive capabilityget_short_video_datano sensitive capabilityget_supply_order_listno sensitive capabilityget_tracesno sensitive capabilityget_traffic_datano sensitive capabilitylist_brandsno sensitive capabilitylist_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_couponsno sensitive capabilitylist_live_roomsno sensitive capabilitylist_logistics_companiesno sensitive capabilitylist_promotionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_affiliate_goodsno sensitive capabilitysearch_productsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-cn-commerce --online --registry pypi
Free public tax reference data — GST/VAT, income, company and capital-gains tax rules for 50+ countries.
The approval gate for unattended UCP buying agents — a policy/approval MCP proxy in front of a merchant's UCP checkout endpoint.
Autotask PSA MCP server. Generic entity query/get/create/update across the full REST API plus convenience tools for tickets, companies, contacts, projects, tasks and time entries. AI-safe with readonly mode and destructive-action confirmation. stdio + opt
MCP server for B2C Commerce developer experience tools
Search, compare and contact real-world companies through a public MCP business directory.
Norwegian business register (Brønnøysundregistrene) as an MCP server — companies, roles, subunits and annual accounts, with the register's silent traps encoded as guards.