Cn Commerce MCP Server

mcp-cn-commerce PyPI v0.1.5

Published by tonywang-hub — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
F
59/100
Last scanned
Trust
F · 59/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
F Why this grade 100 − 40.6 = 59/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−38.5 Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code ×3 MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Grade capped: 3 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (tests/test_automation.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `tests/test_automation.py:939`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/test_automation.py

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (tests/test_cn_commerce_base.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `tests/test_cn_commerce_base.py:914`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/test_cn_commerce_base.py

high Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (tests/test_integration.py)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking JSON Web Token is hardcoded in `tests/test_integration.py:919`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server tests/test_integration.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (shared/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`shared/cli.py:251`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server shared/cli.py

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (shared/cli.py)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`shared/cli.py:185`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: __import__(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server shared/cli.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"mcp-cn-commerce" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package mcp-cn-commerce

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.5 latest F 59/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: F · 59/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-cn-commerce/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-cn-commerce)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-cn-commerce"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-cn-commerce/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/mcp-cn-commerce/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-cn-commerce --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

More in Business & CRM