Cleanor MCP Server

https://mcp.cleanor.app/mcp Remote v0.6.0

Published by mcp.cleanor.app — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Zero-auth image optimize/convert + cited storage, image-format & QR data for AI builders.

Trust grade
A
94/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 94/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: optimize_image ⇒ hmac. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow optimize_image → hmac

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "hmac"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "hmac" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow hmac

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "image_url" on "optimize_image"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "optimize_image" takes a URL/host parameter "image_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool optimize_image · inputSchema.properties.image_url

Tools 22

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • hmacnetwork egressreads sensitive data
  • optimize_imageingests untrusted input
  • base_convertno sensitive capability
  • base64no sensitive capability
  • colorno sensitive capability
  • color_paletteno sensitive capability
  • countno sensitive capability
  • cron_describeno sensitive capability
  • datetimeno sensitive capability
  • diffno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
  • hashno sensitive capability
  • image_format_savingsno sensitive capability
  • json_formatno sensitive capability
  • jwt_decodeno sensitive capability
  • placeholder_imageno sensitive capability
  • qr_codeno sensitive capability
  • regex_testno sensitive capability
  • slugifyno sensitive capability
  • storage_capacityno sensitive capability
  • unit_convertno sensitive capability
  • url_parseno sensitive capability
  • uuidno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 2

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.6.0 latest A 94/100 3 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 94/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan https://mcp.cleanor.app/mcp --online

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