Raw scan report

Chrome Vibemaker Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "mcp-chrome-vibemaker-bridge",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "mcp-chrome-vibemaker-bridge"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "mcp-chrome-vibemaker-bridge"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 98,
    "threatScore": 99,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 1.2,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "heuristic",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.4,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "minimal",
        "label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "minimal",
    "reasons": [],
    "tags": []
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/browser-config.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/browser-config.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/browser-config.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const constant_1 = require(\"./constant\"); var Browse",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/browser-config.js",
        "line": 44,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/build.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/build.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/build.js"
      },
      "evidence": "{ value: true }); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const fs_1 = __importDefault(require(\"fs\")); const p",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/build.js",
        "line": 6,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/doctor.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/doctor.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/doctor.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const constant_1 = require(\"./constant\"); const brow",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/doctor.js",
        "line": 18,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/postinstall.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/postinstall.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/postinstall.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const constant_1 = require(\"./constant\"); const util",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/postinstall.js",
        "line": 10,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/report.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/report.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/report.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const constant_1 = require(\"./constant\"); const brow",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/report.js",
        "line": 17,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/utils.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/utils.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/utils.js"
      },
      "evidence": "t(require(\"os\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const util_1 = require(\"util\"); const constant_1 = r",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/utils.js",
        "line": 21,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
      "title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "\"mcp-chrome-vibemaker-bridge\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
      "remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "mcp-chrome-vibemaker-bridge"
      },
      "evidence": "node dist/scripts/postinstall.js",
      "owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
        "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
      ],
      "data": {
        "scripts": [
          "postinstall"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "bd16f47be5b837500d6a42d5cb3d18ceea56f3bf99434705c5b346e98dec376b",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 0,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 7,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}