Chrome Beta Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-chrome-beta-bridge",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-chrome-beta-bridge"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-chrome-beta-bridge"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 6.3,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/agent/engines/claude.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/claude.js:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/agent/engines/claude.js"
},
"evidence": "Function('",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/agent/engines/claude.js",
"line": 68
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/directory-picker.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/directory-picker.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/agent/directory-picker.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/agent/directory-picker.js",
"line": 16
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/engines/codex.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/codex.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/agent/engines/codex.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/agent/engines/codex.js",
"line": 7
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/open-project.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/open-project.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/agent/open-project.js"
},
"evidence": "spawn(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/agent/open-project.js",
"line": 17
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/browser-config.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/browser-config.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/browser-config.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/browser-config.js",
"line": 44
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/build.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/build.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/build.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/build.js",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/doctor.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/doctor.js",
"line": 18
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/report.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/report.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/report.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/report.js",
"line": 17
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/utils.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/utils.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/utils.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/utils.js",
"line": 21
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/agent/engines/claude.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/engines/claude.js:68`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/agent/engines/claude.js"
},
"evidence": "import(moduleName)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/agent/engines/claude.js",
"line": 68
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"mcp-chrome-beta-bridge\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "mcp-chrome-beta-bridge"
},
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "c2191dd3ee3b32a6ea9778e141186af62ede3bf9ecf322589ad39fc9f4334ed0",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}