Bitbucket Dc (christopherekfeldt) MCP Server

mcp-bitbucket-dc PyPI v1.0.1

Published by christopherekfeldt — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Bitbucket Data Center — code search, file browsing, PRs, commits, and more.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: bitbucket_browse → bitbucket_list_files → bitbucket_create_pull_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow bitbucket_browse → bitbucket_list_files → bitbucket_create_pull_request

Tools 26

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • bitbucket_browseingests untrusted input
  • bitbucket_create_pull_requestnetwork egress
  • bitbucket_list_filesreads sensitive data
  • bitbucket_code_searchno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_create_branchno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_delete_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_branchesno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_commitno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_commit_diffno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_commitsno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
  • bitbucket_get_file_contentno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_projectno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_projectsno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_pull_request_changesno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_pull_request_commentsno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_pull_request_diffno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_pull_requestsno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_required_reviewersno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_get_tagsno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_post_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_search_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_update_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • bitbucket_update_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 2

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.1 latest A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-29
v1.0.0 A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-bitbucket-dc --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Bitbucket Dc 2

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →

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