Baepsae MCP Server
mcp-baepsae
npm
v6.3.0
Source verified
Published by oozoofrog — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Local MCP server for iOS Simulator and macOS app automation with a native Swift bridge
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/info.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/info.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uire("zod"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const utils_js_1 = require("../utils.js"); func
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/info.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eBinaryPath; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_fs_1 = require("node:fs"); const pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/dump-tabbar-actions.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/dump-tabbar-actions.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = path.dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/dump-tabbar-actions.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/research-coordinate-calibration.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/research-coordinate-calibration.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"; import { St
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/research-coordinate-calibration.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/research-input-channels.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/research-input-channels.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"; import { St
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/research-input-channels.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/research-tap-tab-grid.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/research-tap-tab-grid.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"; import { St
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/research-tap-tab-grid.mjs
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate-tool-manifest.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate-tool-manifest.mjs:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ORY_LABELS_KR } = await import(manifestUrl); const READMES = [ { file: path.join(projectRoot, "README.md"), h
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate-tool-manifest.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"mcp-baepsae" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: if [ "$(uname)" = "Darwin" ]; then if [ -f bundled/baepsae-native ] && bundled/baepsae-native --version >/dev/null 2>&1; then exit 0; fi; if command -v swift >/
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package mcp-baepsae
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
activate_appno sensitive capabilityanalyze_uino sensitive capabilitybaepsae_helpno sensitive capabilitybaepsae_versionno sensitive capabilitybuttonno sensitive capabilityclipboardno sensitive capabilitycontext_menu_actionno sensitive capabilitydetect_dialogno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilitydrag_dropno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
enumerate_uino sensitive capabilityfocus_windowno sensitive capabilitygestureno sensitive capabilityget_focused_appno sensitive capabilityhit_testno sensitive capabilityinput_sourceno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitykeyno sensitive capabilitykey_combono sensitive capabilitykey_sequenceno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_input_sourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_simulatorsno sensitive capabilitylist_windowsno sensitive capabilitymenu_actionno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilityquery_uino sensitive capabilityread_ui_paramno sensitive capabilityread_ui_valueno sensitive capabilityrecord_videono sensitive capabilityright_clickno sensitive capabilityrun_stepsno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_appno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityset_ui_valueno sensitive capabilitystream_videono sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitytap_tabno sensitive capabilityterminate_appno sensitive capabilitytouchno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capabilitywait_for_uino sensitive capabilitywatch_notificationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v6.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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