Azure Devops (npm) MCP Server
mcp-azure-devops
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Azure DevOps Model Context Protocol Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (src/docs/updater.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/docs/updater.ts:70`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await axios.get( `https://dev.azure.com/${organization}/_apis/resourceAreas?api-version=7.1-pre
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/docs/updater.ts
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
call_apinetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egresscreate_pull_request_threadnetwork egressadd_work_item_commentno sensitive capabilityconfigure_connectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_git_pushno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_itemno sensitive capabilityget_api_infono sensitive capabilityget_git_fileno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_runno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
get_pipeline_run_logsno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_work_itemno sensitive capabilitylink_work_itemno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_threadsno sensitive capabilitylist_repositoriesno sensitive capabilityquery_work_itemsno sensitive capabilityrun_pipelineno sensitive capabilitysearch_api_docsno sensitive capabilitysearch_identitiesno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_itemno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mcp-azure-devops --onlineOther implementations of Azure Devops 16
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 17 side by side →
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