Ai Hr Management Toolkit — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-ai-hr-management-toolkit",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-ai-hr-management-toolkit"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-ai-hr-management-toolkit"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([content]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, ats_communication]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "content → send_email"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [content] → sinks [send_email, ats_communication]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"content"
],
"sinks": [
"send_email",
"ats_communication"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"content"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_email",
"ats_communication"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "Ingestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Sanitization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Tokenization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Classification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Serialization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_results",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_parse_resumes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assess_candidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_manage_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_schedule_interview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_manage_offers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Rejected",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_generate_demo_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_manage_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_manage_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_interview_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_talent_pool",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_scorecard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_onboarding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats_communication",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "parsing_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Usage Guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Resume Schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse-and-assess-candidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "content",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "role",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "criteria",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare-candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resumes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobDescription",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ats-pipeline-summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "jobId",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "eb3dbf9e8b2fabce780b7684c0d8913cb48a60bf28f20cf3e0ef29adaba0ad9c",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}