Agent — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-agent",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-agent"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-agent"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/format.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/format.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/format.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/format.py",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/gen_schema.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/gen_schema.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/gen_schema.py"
},
"evidence": "exec(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/gen_schema.py",
"line": 161
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/lint.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/lint.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/lint.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/lint.py",
"line": 28
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/cloud/commands/deploy/wrangler_wrapper.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/cloud/commands/deploy/wrangler_wrapper.py:418`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/cloud/commands/deploy/wrangler_wrapper.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/cloud/commands/deploy/wrangler_wrapper.py",
"line": 418
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py",
"line": 43
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/config.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/config.py:313`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/config.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/config.py",
"line": 313
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/dev.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/dev.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/dev.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/dev.py",
"line": 46
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/install.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/install.py:412`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/install.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/install.py",
"line": 412
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp_agent/cli/utils/git_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/utils/git_utils.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/utils/git_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/utils/git_utils.py",
"line": 38
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/mcp_agent/telemetry/usage_tracking.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/telemetry/usage_tracking.py:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/telemetry/usage_tracking.py"
},
"evidence": "requests.post(\"https://telemetry.example.com/usage\"",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/telemetry/usage_tracking.py",
"line": 16
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py:133`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py"
},
"evidence": "__import__(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/commands/build.py",
"line": 133
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (src/mcp_agent/cli/secrets/yaml_tags.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp_agent/cli/secrets/yaml_tags.py:107`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp_agent/cli/secrets/yaml_tags.py"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "src/mcp_agent/cli/secrets/yaml_tags.py",
"line": 107
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"mcp-agent\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "mcp-agent"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "269815b1998dc652068387f88e1235851bd1a05c0c1b2676c4026297e8321a22",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 9,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}