Agent Trace Inspector — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-agent-trace-inspector",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-agent-trace-inspector"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-agent-trace-inspector"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([trace_step]) co-exist with external-action tools ([configure_alerts]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "trace_step → configure_alerts"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [trace_step] → sinks [configure_alerts]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"trace_step"
],
"sinks": [
"configure_alerts"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"webhook_url\" on \"configure_alerts\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"configure_alerts\" takes a URL/host parameter \"webhook_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "configure_alerts",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.webhook_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "webhook_url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"trace_step"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"configure_alerts"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "trace_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trace_step",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "trace_end",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trace_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_traces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_traces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_reasoning_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_otel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_alerts",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_retention_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_retention",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_compliance_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "25517c2b8479e2345b5b8b507c25f17637064fc813a3c08b0c26d98843c76ac2",
"stats": {
"tools": 13,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}