Adr Analysis — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-adr-analysis-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-adr-analysis-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-adr-analysis-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 83,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.03,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js:262`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "private.*key/, /id_rsa$/, /id_ed25519$/, /\\.pem$/, /\\.p12$/, /\\.pfx$/, /",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js",
"line": 262,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/resources/deployment-status-resource.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/resources/deployment-status-resource.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/resources/deployment-status-resource.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resourceCache, generateETag } from '.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/resources/deployment-status-resource.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/resources/environment-analysis-resource.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/resources/environment-analysis-resource.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/resources/environment-analysis-resource.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resourceCache, generateETag } from '.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/resources/environment-analysis-resource.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/resources/project-metrics-resource.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/resources/project-metrics-resource.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/resources/project-metrics-resource.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resourceCache, generateETag } from '.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/resources/project-metrics-resource.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/tools/deployment-readiness-tool.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/tools/deployment-readiness-tool.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/tools/deployment-readiness-tool.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/tools/deployment-readiness-tool.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/tools/smart-git-push-tool-v2.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/tools/smart-git-push-tool-v2.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/tools/smart-git-push-tool-v2.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, statSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/tools/smart-git-push-tool-v2.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/adr-context-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/adr-context-detector.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/adr-context-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Pred",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/adr-context-detector.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/adr-timeline-extractor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/adr-timeline-extractor.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/adr-timeline-extractor.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { stat } from 'fs/promises'; const exec",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/adr-timeline-extractor.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/environment-capability-registry.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/environment-capability-registry.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/environment-capability-registry.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as os from 'os'; import { EnhancedLog",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/environment-capability-registry.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { McpAdrError } from '../types/index.js'; /** * Detect git remote origin",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync, readFileSync } from 'fs'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js:165`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "t' : ''; return execSync(`git rev-parse ${format} HEAD`, { cwd: projectPath, encoding: '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/src/utils/git-remote-detector.js",
"line": 165,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js:25`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`gitleaks detect --source=${tempFile} --report-format=json --report-path=${outputFile}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/src/utils/gitleaks-detector.js",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/utils/release-tracker.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/release-tracker.js:136`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/release-tracker.js"
},
"evidence": "const check = execSync(`git merge-base --is-ancestor ${c.hash.substring(0, 8)} ${release.commitRange.to}`, { c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/src/utils/release-tracker.js",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/src/utils/tree-sitter-analyzer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/utils/tree-sitter-analyzer.js:83`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/utils/tree-sitter-analyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "const module = await import(packageName); Parser = module.default || module; }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/src/utils/tree-sitter-analyzer.js",
"line": 83,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "mcp-adr-analysis-server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Session State",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Analysis Report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ADR List",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Todo List",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Research Index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Rule Catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Rule Generation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ADR by ID",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Research by Topic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Todo by Task ID",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Rule by ID",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Deployment Status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Environment Analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Memory Snapshots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Project Metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Technology by Name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Pattern by Name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Deployment History",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Release History",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Code Quality",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Validated Patterns Catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Validated Pattern by Platform",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Pattern Authoritative Sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Pattern Base Code Repository",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "5553e1b4a66cd25b742835656fd4e6fa5aab9b2b3c4117c8d01d81f5dfe51312",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 4,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}