3d Printer — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mcp-3d-printer-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mcp-3d-printer-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "mcp-3d-printer-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([list_printer_files]) and tools that can send data out ([check_fulu_orca_setup, fulu_bambu_network_rpc, blender_mcp_edit_model]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_printer_files → check_fulu_orca_setup"
},
"evidence": "sources [list_printer_files] → sinks [check_fulu_orca_setup, fulu_bambu_network_rpc, blender_mcp_edit_model]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"list_printer_files"
],
"sinks": [
"check_fulu_orca_setup",
"fulu_bambu_network_rpc",
"blender_mcp_edit_model"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"check_fulu_orca_setup\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"check_fulu_orca_setup\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "check_fulu_orca_setup"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fulu_bambu_network_rpc"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"blender_mcp_edit_model\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"blender_mcp_edit_model\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "blender_mcp_edit_model"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/fulu-orca.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/fulu-orca.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/fulu-orca.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const BRIDGE_MAGIC = 0x52424a50; const FRAME_TYPE_JSON_REQUEST = 1; const FRAME_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/fulu-orca.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1868`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1868,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/stl/stl-manipulator.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/stl/stl-manipulator.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/stl/stl-manipulator.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; const readFileAsync = promisify(fs.readFile); const writeFileAsync = promisify(f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/stl/stl-manipulator.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/fulu-orca.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/fulu-orca.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/fulu-orca.ts"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const BRIDGE_MAGIC = 0x52424a50; const FRAME_TYPE_JSON_REQUEST = 1; const FRAME",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/fulu-orca.ts",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:2275`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const result = await new Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string }>((resol",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 2275,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/stl/stl-manipulator.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/stl/stl-manipulator.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/stl/stl-manipulator.ts"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; const readFileAsync = promisify(fs.readFile); const writeFileAsync = promisify(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/stl/stl-manipulator.ts",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"bridge_command\" on \"check_fulu_orca_setup\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"check_fulu_orca_setup\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"bridge_command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "check_fulu_orca_setup",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.bridge_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "bridge_command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"bridge_command\" on \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"bridge_command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fulu_bambu_network_rpc",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.bridge_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "bridge_command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"bridge_command\" on \"blender_mcp_edit_model\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"blender_mcp_edit_model\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"bridge_command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "blender_mcp_edit_model",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.bridge_command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "bridge_command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"check_fulu_orca_setup\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"check_fulu_orca_setup\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "check_fulu_orca_setup"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"fulu_bambu_network_rpc\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "fulu_bambu_network_rpc"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"blender_mcp_edit_model\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"blender_mcp_edit_model\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "blender_mcp_edit_model"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_printer_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"check_fulu_orca_setup",
"fulu_bambu_network_rpc",
"blender_mcp_edit_model"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"list_printer_files",
"blender_mcp_edit_model"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: list_printer_files → blender_mcp_edit_model."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "mcp-3d-printer-server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "3D Printer Status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "3D Printer Files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_printer_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_printer_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "upload_gcode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_print",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_print",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_printer_temperature",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extend_stl_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slice_stl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_temperatures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_and_print_stl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_stl_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scale_stl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rotate_stl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "translate_stl",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "modify_stl_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_stl_visualization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "print_3mf",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_fulu_orca_setup",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "fulu_bambu_network_rpc",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "merge_vertices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "center_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lay_flat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "blender_mcp_edit_model",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "5bf1d7fa2f84a8635b1c824dc5df5dbed711d44b17a8ea7c8561506618ce5df7",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 3,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}