Foundry — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@maxencerb/foundry-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@maxencerb/foundry-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@maxencerb/foundry-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (92 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"chisel_eval\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"chisel_eval\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chisel_eval"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"forge_script\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"forge_script\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "forge_script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/resources/project.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/resources/project.ts:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/resources/project.ts"
},
"evidence": "const result = await exec(\"forge\", [\"remappings\"], projectPath); return { contents: [ {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/resources/project.ts",
"line": 87,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/cast.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/cast.ts:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/cast.ts"
},
"evidence": "const result = await exec(\"cast\", [\"block\", ...args]); return textContent(formatOutput(result)); } );",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/cast.ts",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/chisel.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/chisel.ts:116`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/chisel.ts"
},
"evidence": "const result = await exec(\"chisel\", [\"list\"]); return textContent(formatOutput(result)); } ); // chise",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/chisel.ts",
"line": 116,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/forge.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/forge.ts:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/forge.ts"
},
"evidence": "const result = await exec(\"forge\", [\"init\", ...args], context.projectPath); return textContent(formatOutput(res",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/forge.ts",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/help.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/help.ts:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/help.ts"
},
"evidence": "const result = await exec(\"forge\", args); return textContent(formatOutput(result)); } ); // cast --hel",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/help.ts",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/exec.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/utils/exec.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/utils/exec.ts"
},
"evidence": "export async function exec( command: string, args: string[] = [], cwd?: string ): Promise<CommandResult> { con",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/utils/exec.ts",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"code\" on \"chisel_eval\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"chisel_eval\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"code\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chisel_eval",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.code"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "code"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"forge_script\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"forge_script\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "forge_script",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"chisel_eval\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"chisel_eval\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chisel_eval"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"forge_script\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"forge_script\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "forge_script"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "anvil_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_mine",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_setBalance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_setCode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_setStorageAt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_impersonateAccount",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_stopImpersonatingAccount",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_revert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_setNextBlockTimestamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_increaseTime",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_setAutomine",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_reset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_getAccounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_block_number",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_chain_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_client",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_gas_price",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_base_fee",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_balance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_nonce",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_storage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_send",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_publish",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_tx",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_estimate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_abi_encode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_abi_decode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_calldata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_calldata_decode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_sig",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_sig_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_4byte",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_4byte_decode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_to_wei",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_from_wei",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_to_hex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_to_dec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_to_base",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_keccak",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_resolve_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_lookup_address",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_compute_address",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_create2",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_interface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_age",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_wallet_new",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_wallet_address",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_wallet_sign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_format_bytes32",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_parse_bytes32",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_concat_hex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_eval",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_load",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_view",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_script",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "forge_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_flatten",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_remappings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_clean",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_install",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_fmt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_selectors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_bind",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cast_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anvil_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chisel_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "foundry_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "foundry_list_commands",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fd6752051b44b8f2d2a4384b906316b7a9aec2ca605f44526970b3904c96c209",
"stats": {
"tools": 92,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}