Redact — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "@mattzam/redact-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@mattzam/redact-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@mattzam/redact-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: redact_proxy_request → redact_read_file ⇒ redact_proxy_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "redact_proxy_request → redact_read_file → redact_proxy_request"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"sources": [
"redact_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"path": [
"redact_proxy_request",
"redact_read_file",
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "redact_proxy_request",
"to": "redact_read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "redact_read_file",
"to": "redact_proxy_request",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"redact_proxy_request\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"redact_proxy_request\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "redact_proxy_request",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"redact_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"redact_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "redact_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"redact_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"redact_proxy_request",
"redact_read_file",
"redact_proxy_request"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: redact_proxy_request → redact_read_file ⇒ redact_proxy_request."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "redact_obfuscate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redact_deobfuscate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redact_proxy_request",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "redact_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "redact_add_mapping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redact_remove_mapping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redact_show_mappings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "redact_audit_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f22aeb0cbcfac119c5e0dcd746ae2b879fcf6021412e8d9992a4352ef584a23f",
"stats": {
"tools": 8,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}