Mattermost (PyPI) MCP Server
mattermost-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Mattermost Team Collaboration MCP Server and Agent for Agentic AI!
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/security_sanitizer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/security_sanitizer.py:136`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/security_sanitizer.py
Tools 53
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mattermost_mcp_access_controlno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_actionsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_agentsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_audit_loggingno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_boardsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_bookmarksno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_botsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_brandno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_channelsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_cloudno sensitive capability
Show 43 more tools ↓
mattermost_mcp_clusterno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_commandsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_complianceno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_content_flaggingno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_custom_profile_attributesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_dataretentionno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_elasticsearchno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_emojino sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_exportsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_filesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_groupsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_importsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_ip_filtersno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_jobsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_ldapno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_limitsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_logsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_metricsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_oauthno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_outgoing_oauth_connectionsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_pluginsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_postsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_preferencesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_propertiesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_reactionsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_recapsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_remoteclustersno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_reportsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_rolesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_samlno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_scheduled_postno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_schemesno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_service_termsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_sharedchannelsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_statusno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_systemno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_teamsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_uploadsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_usageno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_usersno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_viewsno sensitive capabilitymattermost_mcp_webhooksno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (53 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mattermost-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Mattermost 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
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