Modlens (mattabase) MCP Server
@mattabase/modlens-mcp
npm
v1.4.0
Published by @mattabase — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/java-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/java-tools.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { createWriteStream, mkdirSync } from "fs"; import { pipeline } from "str
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/java-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/launcher.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); // ── Resolve paths (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/launcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mappings.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mappings.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; // ── Cache dirs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mappings.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/graphify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/graphify.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn, execFile } from "child_process"; import { join } from "path"; import { writeFile, readFile, mkdir, unlink } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/graphify.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/mappings.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/mappings.js:105`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://meta.fabricmc.net/v2/versions/yarn/${encodeURIComponent(mcVersion)}`); if
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mappings.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/platform.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/platform.js:163`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h const res = await fetch(`https://api.modrinth.com/v2/project/P7dR8mSH/version?loaders=%5B%22fabric%22%5D`, { heade
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/platform.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from "fs"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/backup.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/backup.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { cpSync, mkdirSync, existsSync, appendFileSync, copyFileSync } from "fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/backup.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/post-update.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/post-update.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "fs"; import { join, dirname } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/post-update.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@mattabase/modlens-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: prisma generate
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @mattabase/modlens-mcp
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mc_filesreads sensitive datamod_jarreads sensitive dataplatformingests untrusted inputanalyze_crash_logno sensitive capabilitycheck_mod_compatno sensitive capabilitydocsno sensitive capabilityfind_missing_depsno sensitive capabilitygradleno sensitive capabilitykubejsno sensitive capabilitymappingsno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
mc_datano sensitive capabilitymc_registryno sensitive capabilitymc_sourceno sensitive capabilitymc_versionsno sensitive capabilitymixin_scanno sensitive capabilitymodno sensitive capabilitymod_bytecodeno sensitive capabilitymod_datano sensitive capabilitymod_mixinsno sensitive capabilitymod_tagsno sensitive capabilitymodpacks_chno sensitive capabilitypack_toolsno sensitive capabilityprimersno sensitive capabilityreportsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
A 91/100 | 10 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mattabase/modlens-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Modlens 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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