Matlab (subspace-lab) MCP Server

matlab-mcp-server PyPI v0.2.3

Published by subspace-lab — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
B
83/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 83/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 17.5 = 83/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−15.4 Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 injection
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 8

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py:147`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (examples/advanced_test.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`examples/advanced_test.py:32`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server examples/advanced_test.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (examples/basic_test.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`examples/basic_test.py:41`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server examples/basic_test.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (examples/quick_shared_session.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`examples/quick_shared_session.py:18`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server examples/quick_shared_session.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (examples/shared_session_demo.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`examples/shared_session_demo.py:30`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server examples/shared_session_demo.py

high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py:147`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/matlab_mcp_server/engine.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/run_tests.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/run_tests.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"matlab-mcp-server" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package matlab-mcp-server

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.3 latest B 83/100 8 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 83/100
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