Mason Context — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mason-context",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mason-context"
},
"server": {
"name": "mason-context"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([get_code_samples]) and tools that can send data out ([export_to_confluence]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_code_samples → export_to_confluence"
},
"evidence": "sources [get_code_samples] → sinks [export_to_confluence]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"get_code_samples"
],
"sinks": [
"export_to_confluence"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mason-auto.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-auto.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-auto.js"
},
"evidence": "=> /^(?:\\.env(?:\\..*)?|id_rsa.*|id_ed25519.*)$|\\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$|credentials\\.|secret|^local\\.propert",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mason-auto.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mason-drift.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-drift.js:77`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-drift.js"
},
"evidence": "=> /^(?:\\.env(?:\\..*)?|id_rsa.*|id_ed25519.*)$|\\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$|credentials\\.|secret|^local\\.propert",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mason-drift.js",
"line": 77,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mason-mcp.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-mcp.js:271`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "=> /^(?:\\.env(?:\\..*)?|id_rsa.*|id_ed25519.*)$|\\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$|credentials\\.|secret|^local\\.propert",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mason-mcp.js",
"line": 271,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mason-review.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-review.js:84`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-review.js"
},
"evidence": "=> /^(?:\\.env(?:\\..*)?|id_rsa.*|id_ed25519.*)$|\\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$|credentials\\.|secret|^local\\.propert",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mason-review.js",
"line": 84,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mason.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason.js:48`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason.js"
},
"evidence": "=> /^(?:\\.env(?:\\..*)?|id_rsa.*|id_ed25519.*)$|\\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$|credentials\\.|secret|^local\\.propert",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/mason.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-audit.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-audit.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-audit.js"
},
"evidence": "le as execFile3 } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify as promisify3 } from \"util\"; // src/snapshot/snapshot.ts imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-audit.js",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-auto.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-auto.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-auto.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import fg from \"fast-glob\"; function isSensiti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-auto.js",
"line": 43,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-drift.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-drift.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-drift.js"
},
"evidence": "le as execFile3 } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify as promisify3 } from \"util\"; // src/snapshot/snapshot.ts imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-drift.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-hook.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-hook.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-hook.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import fg from \"fast-glob\"; var exec = promisi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-hook.js",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-mcp.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-mcp.js:266`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-mcp.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import fg from \"fast-glob\"; function isSensiti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-mcp.js",
"line": 266,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason-review.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason-review.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason-review.js"
},
"evidence": "le as execFile5 } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify as promisify5 } from \"util\"; // src/drift/drift.ts import fs",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason-review.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mason.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason.js:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import fg from \"fast-glob\"; function isSensiti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mason.js",
"line": 43,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/mason.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mason.js:5396`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mason.js"
},
"evidence": "y), ...args]; await import(binary.href); } else throw new Error(\"Unknown command: \" + command + \". Run mason --hel",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/mason.js",
"line": 5396,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_code_samples"
],
"externalSink": [
"export_to_confluence"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_code_samples",
"export_to_confluence"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: get_code_samples → export_to_confluence."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "mason_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mason_automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mason_repair",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mason_complete_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mason_set_confluence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "full_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_code_samples",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_snapshot_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_partial_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reduce_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mason_check_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_snapshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_to_confluence",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3d74bf207b7414fc42c6f0cde3222492f955c2bfb1b4fe25574942e4d75a9d18",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 13,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}