Redmine Mcp Ro MCP Server
@martin4455/redmine-mcp-ro
npm
v0.1.1
Published by @martin4455 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-mcp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-mcp.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/run-automated-test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/run-automated-test.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/run-automated-test.js
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_attachmentingests untrusted inputdownload_issue_attachmentsingests untrusted inputlist_project_filesreads sensitive dataget_attachmentno sensitive capabilityget_attachment_contentno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_groupno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_issue_categoryno sensitive capabilityget_membershipno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_relationno sensitive capabilityget_roleno sensitive capabilityget_time_entryno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityget_versionno sensitive capabilityget_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilitylist_custom_fieldsno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_prioritiesno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_relationsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_statusesno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_newsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_issue_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_membershipsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_rolesno sensitive capabilitylist_time_entriesno sensitive capabilitylist_time_entry_activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_trackersno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_wiki_pagesno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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