mantic.dzind
npm
v0.1.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Model Context Protocol server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow create_webhook
Tools that read sensitive data ([create_webhook]) and tools that can send data out ([send_email, create_sms, create_webhook, upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [create_webhook] → sinks [send_email, create_sms, create_webhook, upload_file]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow create_webhook → send_email
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive datacreate_smsnetwork egresssend_emailnetwork egressupload_filenetwork egressadd_contact_pointsno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_tagsno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_to_campaignno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_to_companyno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_to_segmentno sensitive capabilitychange_contact_stageno sensitive capabilitycreate_assetno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaign_with_automationno sensitive capabilitycreate_categoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_companyno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_contact_fieldno sensitive capabilitycreate_email_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_pageno sensitive capabilitycreate_reportno sensitive capabilitycreate_segmentno sensitive capabilitycreate_tagno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilityexecute_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_assetno sensitive capabilityget_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_contactsno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_contact_activityno sensitive capabilityget_contact_notesno sensitive capabilityget_emailno sensitive capabilityget_email_statsno sensitive capabilityget_formno sensitive capabilityget_form_submissionsno sensitive capabilityget_segment_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_companiesno sensitive capabilitylist_contact_fieldsno sensitive capabilitylist_emailsno sensitive capabilitylist_formsno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_reportsno sensitive capabilitylist_segmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_smsno sensitive capabilitylist_stagesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysubtract_contact_pointsno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mantic.dzind --online
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