Manos MCP Server
manos-mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by ryanperkins — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A CLI MCP server for ad-hoc UI testing of Android & iOS apps — a tight act+observe loop, device-condition control, log/crash & network capture, OCR targeting, accessibility audits, and session recording that exports a replayable flow.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (assets/frida/sidecar.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`assets/frida/sidecar.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n", help="package id to spawn (catches startup traffic)") ap.add_argument("--hook", required=True, help="path to okh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server assets/frida/sidecar.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/maestro.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/maestro.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await exec("maestro", args, { timeoutMs: opts.timeoutMs ?? 300_000, allowNonZe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/maestro.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/maestroDriver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/maestroDriver.js:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await exec("maestro", ["--udid", deviceId, "hierarchy"], { timeoutMs: 60_000 }); // maestro prints
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/maestroDriver.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/maestroSession.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/maestroSession.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/maestroSession.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/netcapture.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/netcapture.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { readFile, writeFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/netcapture.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/ocr.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/ocr.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ive: true }); await exec("swiftc", [VISION_SRC, "-O", "-o", VISION_BIN], { timeoutMs: 120_000 }); if (!existsSyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/ocr.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/android.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/android.js:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : args; return exec(this.adbPath, full, { timeoutMs: opts?.timeoutMs ?? 20_000 }); } shell(serial, comm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/android.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/ios.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/ios.js:77`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: opts) { return exec("xcrun", ["simctl", ...args], { timeoutMs: opts?.timeoutMs ?? 30_000,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/ios.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/util/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/util/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; export class ExecError extends Error { result; constructor(message, resu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/util/exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/util/toolchain.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/util/toolchain.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const r = await exec(file, versionArgs, { timeoutMs: 5_000, allowNonZero: true }); version = (r.stdout |
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/util/toolchain.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/maestroSession.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/maestroSession.js:168`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { const out = execSync(`pgrep -f '${WARM_JVM_SIGNATURE}'`, { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/maestroSession.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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