Mailpouch MCP Server
mailpouch
npm
v4.0.3
Source verified
Published by chandshy — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
mailpouch — lean, permission-gated MCP access to Proton Mail via Proton Bridge, with up to 86 tools, resources, and prompts.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/crypto/credential-encryption.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/crypto/credential-encryption.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { join } from "path"; /** * Resolve a per-system secret used as addition
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/crypto/credential-encryption.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { startSettingsServer } from "./settings/server.js"; import { openBrowser
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/notifications/desktop-prompt.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/notifications/desktop-prompt.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { logger } from "../utils/logger.js"; const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/notifications/desktop-prompt.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/notifications/desktop.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/notifications/desktop.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { logger } from "../utils/logger.js"; /** Escape a string for inclusion i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/notifications/desktop.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/pass-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/pass-service.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { createHash } from "crypto"; import { appendFileSync, existsSync, readFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/pass-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/settings-main.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/settings-main.js:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "fs"; import { fileURLToPath as _fileURLToPath } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/settings-main.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/settings/security.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/settings/security.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, existsSync, rmSync } from "fs"; import { tmp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/settings/security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/settings/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/settings/server.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { Socket } from "net"; import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "cryp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/settings/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/settings/tui.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/settings/tui.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from "child_process"; import { Socket } from "net"; import { loadConfig, saveConfig, defaultConfig, bu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/settings/tui.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (native/tray/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`native/tray/index.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst lddPath = require('child_process').execSync('which ldd').toString().trim() return readFileSync(lddPath, 'utf8
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server native/tray/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/security/keychain.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/security/keychain.js:49`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on("specifier", "return import(specifier)"); keyringModule = await importFn("@napi-rs/keyring"); return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security/keychain.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"mailpouch" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/install-hooks.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package mailpouch
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
thread_summaryingests untrusted inputtriage_inboxingests untrusted inputcompose_replyno sensitive capabilitydaily_briefingno sensitive capabilitydraft_in_my_voiceno sensitive capabilityEmail Folderno sensitive capabilityEmail Messageno sensitive capabilityemailIdno sensitive capabilityfind_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityfocusno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
folderno sensitive capabilityintentno sensitive capabilitylimitno sensitive capabilityrecipientno sensitive capabilitysampleCountno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.0.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v4.0.2 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v4.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v3.2.1 |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v3.2.0 |
A 92/100 | 12 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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