Mailgent Dev MCP Server
@mailgent-dev/mcp
npm
v0.7.1
Published by @mailgent-dev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Mailgent — Identity infrastructure for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: mail_get_attachment → vault_storeApiKey → slack_list_messages. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow mail_get_attachment → vault_storeApiKey → slack_list_messages
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
slack_list_messagesingests untrusted inputnetwork egressmail_get_attachmentingests untrusted inputpayments_mandates_getingests untrusted inputslack_send_messagenetwork egressvault_storeApiKeyreads sensitive datavault_storeShippingAddressnetwork egresscalendar_createno sensitive capabilitycalendar_deleteno sensitive capabilitycalendar_getno sensitive capabilitycalendar_listno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
calendar_set_publicno sensitive capabilitycalendar_updateno sensitive capabilityidentities_createno sensitive capabilityidentities_deleteno sensitive capabilityidentities_getno sensitive capabilityidentities_listno sensitive capabilityidentities_rotate_keyno sensitive capabilityidentities_updateno sensitive capabilityidentities_update_scopesno sensitive capabilityidentity_signno sensitive capabilityidentity_verifyno sensitive capabilityidentity_whoamino sensitive capabilitymail_add_ruleno sensitive capabilitymail_delete_messageno sensitive capabilitymail_delete_ruleno sensitive capabilitymail_delete_threadno sensitive capabilitymail_get_messageno sensitive capabilitymail_get_threadno sensitive capabilitymail_list_messagesno sensitive capabilitymail_list_rulesno sensitive capabilitymail_list_threadsno sensitive capabilitymail_replyno sensitive capabilitymail_sendno sensitive capabilitymail_update_labelsno sensitive capabilitymail_update_thread_labelsno sensitive capabilitypayments_activityno sensitive capabilitypayments_mandates_createno sensitive capabilitypayments_mandates_listno sensitive capabilitypayments_mandates_revokeno sensitive capabilitypayments_payno sensitive capabilityslack_list_channelsno sensitive capabilitysocial_get_postno sensitive capabilitysocial_list_accountsno sensitive capabilitysocial_postno sensitive capabilityvault_deleteno sensitive capabilityvault_getno sensitive capabilityvault_listno sensitive capabilityvault_storeno sensitive capabilityvault_storeCardno sensitive capabilityvault_totpno sensitive capabilityvault_totp_use_backupno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mailgent-dev/mcp --onlineMore in Security & Testing
The Stripe Agent Toolkit enables popular agent frameworks including LangChain and Vercel's AI SDK to integrate with Stripe APIs through function calling.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AgentGate. Enables Claude and other MCP-compatible AI assistants to request approvals.
Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints
MCP server for aigently security guardrails — reads static catalog-data JSON, zero API dependency
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.