Mailbridge MCP Server
mailbridge-mcp
npm
v2.6.1
Published by creativestefan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Connect your AI assistant to email — read, search, send, and organise via IMAP/SMTP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { dirname } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; const __dir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([read_attachment, read_emails, get_emails_with_preview, get_thread, unified_inbox]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [read_attachment, read_emails, get_emails_with_preview, get_thread, unified_inbox] → sinks [send_email]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow read_attachment → send_email
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "remove_account" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool remove_account · description
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/accounts.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/accounts.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { dirname, join } from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/accounts.js
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_emails_with_previewingests untrusted inputget_threadingests untrusted inputread_attachmentingests untrusted inputread_emailsingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressunified_inboxingests untrusted inputadd_accountno sensitive capabilityadd_ruleno sensitive capabilityapply_rulesno sensitive capabilitybulk_deleteno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
bulk_mark_readno sensitive capabilitybulk_mark_unreadno sensitive capabilitybulk_moveno sensitive capabilitycancel_scheduledno sensitive capabilitycheck_connectionno sensitive capabilitycheck_email_opensno sensitive capabilitycomplete_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_emailno sensitive capabilityexport_emailno sensitive capabilityextract_calendar_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_attachmentsno sensitive capabilityget_contact_historyno sensitive capabilityget_email_bodyno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduledno sensitive capabilitylist_tracked_emailsno sensitive capabilitymark_as_readno sensitive capabilitymark_as_unreadno sensitive capabilitymove_emailno sensitive capabilityopen_setupno sensitive capabilityremove_accountno sensitive capabilityremove_all_accountsno sensitive capabilityremove_ruleno sensitive capabilityreply_to_emailno sensitive capabilitysave_draftno sensitive capabilityschedule_emailno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysend_draftno sensitive capabilityset_reminderno sensitive capabilityswitch_accountno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_emailno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.6.1 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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