Linkedin (maheidem) MCP Server
@maheidem/linkedin-mcp
npm
v2.2.0
Published by @maheidem — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Comprehensive LinkedIn API MCP server with automatic Claude configuration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("http"); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const simple_token_manager_js_1 = require("./simple-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-setup.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (require("url")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const inquirer_1 = __importDefault(require("inquirer
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth-setup.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/api/linkedin-client.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/api/linkedin-client.js:89`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://www.linkedin.com/oauth/v2/accessToken', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/api/linkedin-client.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/linkedin-basic-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/linkedin-basic-mcp.js:303`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.linkedin.com/v2', { method: 'GET', }); tests.push
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/linkedin-basic-mcp.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/linkedin-complete-mcp-v2.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/linkedin-complete-mcp-v2.js:405`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st userResponse = await fetch('https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo', { headers: { 'Authoriz
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/linkedin-complete-mcp-v2.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js:250`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://www.linkedin.com/oauth/v2/accessToken', { method: 'POST', headers
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/linkedin-complete-mcp.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/linkedin-working-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/linkedin-working-mcp.js:190`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://www.linkedin.com/oauth/v2/accessToken', { method: 'POST', headers
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/linkedin-working-mcp.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/oauth-setup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-setup.js:266`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://www.linkedin.com/oauth/v2/accessToken', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth-setup.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (examples/post-to-linkedin.js)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/post-to-linkedin.js:31`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st userResponse = await fetch('https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo', { headers: { 'Authorization': `Beare
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/post-to-linkedin.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/get-linkedin-token.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/get-linkedin-token.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const readline = require('readline'); async function getLinkedInToken() { co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/get-linkedin-token.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/linkedin-mcp-demo.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/linkedin-mcp-demo.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); async function callLinkedIn(toolName, args = {}) { const process = spawn('np
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/linkedin-mcp-demo.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/linkedin-oauth-complete.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/linkedin-oauth-complete.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const http = require('http'); const url = require('url'); const { execSync } =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/linkedin-oauth-complete.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/linkedin-oauth-debug.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/linkedin-oauth-debug.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const http = require('http'); const url = require('url'); const { execSync } =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/linkedin-oauth-debug.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/linkedin-oauth-local.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/linkedin-oauth-local.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const http = require('http'); const url = require('url'); const { execSync } =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/linkedin-oauth-local.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/linkedin-success.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/linkedin-success.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const http = require('http'); const url = require('url'); const { execSync } =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/linkedin-success.js
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
linkedin_messaging_send_messagenetwork egresscreate_update_guideno sensitive capabilitygenerate_summaryno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ads_create_campaignno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ads_get_analyticsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ads_get_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ads_get_targeting_facetsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ads_update_campaignno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_analyze_profile_from_datano sensitive capabilitylinkedin_assets_get_upload_urlno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
linkedin_assets_uploadno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_authenticateno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_auto_authno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_check_authno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_compliance_get_eventsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_create_optimized_postno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_create_postno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_events_createno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_events_getno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_exchange_codeno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_generate_optimized_contentno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_api_healthno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_auth_urlno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_feedno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_post_commentsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_post_detailsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_profileno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_rate_limitsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_user_activityno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_user_infono sensitive capabilitylinkedin_get_user_postsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_jobs_postno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_jobs_searchno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_learning_get_classificationsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_learning_get_coursesno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_logoutno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_messaging_get_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_oauth_exchange_codeno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_oauth_get_auth_urlno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_oauth_refresh_tokenno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_organizations_get_companyno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_organizations_get_follower_statsno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_people_get_profileno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_people_search_membersno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_post_profile_updateno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_posts_createno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_posts_deleteno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_posts_getno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_posts_updateno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_request_profile_api_accessno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_sales_navigator_profile_associationno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_social_actions_commentno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_social_actions_likeno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_social_actions_shareno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_talent_unified_searchno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_test_connectionno sensitive capabilitylinkedin_ugc_createno sensitive capabilitytrack_updatesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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