magpipe-mcp-server
npm
v0.2.1
Published by elagerway — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Magpipe — manage agents, calls, SMS, contacts, and phone numbers from AI coding tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([get_recording, sync_knowledge_source]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_sms]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_recording, sync_knowledge_source] → sinks [send_sms]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_recording → send_sms
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_recordingingests untrusted inputsend_smsnetwork egresssync_knowledge_sourceingests untrusted inputadd_knowledge_manualno sensitive capabilityadd_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capabilityassign_phone_numberno sensitive capabilitycancel_bookingno sensitive capabilitychat_with_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilitycreate_bookingno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_custom_functionno sensitive capabilitycreate_test_caseno sensitive capabilitycreate_test_suiteno sensitive capabilitydelete_agentno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_custom_functionno sensitive capabilitydelete_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capabilitydelete_voiceno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_calendar_slotsno sensitive capabilityget_callno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_messageno sensitive capabilityget_test_runno sensitive capabilityinitiate_callno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_callsno sensitive capabilitylist_chat_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_custom_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_sourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduled_actionsno sensitive capabilitylist_test_casesno sensitive capabilitylist_test_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_test_suitesno sensitive capabilitylist_voicesno sensitive capabilitylookup_phone_numberno sensitive capabilitymanage_api_keysno sensitive capabilitymanage_dynamic_variablesno sensitive capabilityprovision_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityrelease_phone_numberno sensitive capabilityrun_test_caseno sensitive capabilitysearch_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilityterminate_callno sensitive capabilityupdate_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_custom_functionno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan magpipe-mcp-server --online
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