Magpipe MCP Server

magpipe-mcp-server npm v0.2.1

Published by elagerway — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Magpipe — manage agents, calls, SMS, contacts, and phone numbers from AI coding tools

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_recording, sync_knowledge_source]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_sms]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_recording, sync_knowledge_source] → sinks [send_sms]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_recording → send_sms

Tools 51

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_recordingingests untrusted input
  • send_smsnetwork egress
  • sync_knowledge_sourceingests untrusted input
  • add_knowledge_manualno sensitive capability
  • add_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capability
  • assign_phone_numberno sensitive capability
  • cancel_bookingno sensitive capability
  • chat_with_agentno sensitive capability
  • create_agentno sensitive capability
  • create_bookingno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
  • create_contactno sensitive capability
  • create_custom_functionno sensitive capability
  • create_test_caseno sensitive capability
  • create_test_suiteno sensitive capability
  • delete_agentno sensitive capability
  • delete_contactno sensitive capability
  • delete_custom_functionno sensitive capability
  • delete_knowledge_sourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_voiceno sensitive capability
  • get_agentno sensitive capability
  • get_calendar_slotsno sensitive capability
  • get_callno sensitive capability
  • get_contactno sensitive capability
  • get_messageno sensitive capability
  • get_test_runno sensitive capability
  • initiate_callno sensitive capability
  • list_agentsno sensitive capability
  • list_callsno sensitive capability
  • list_chat_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_custom_functionsno sensitive capability
  • list_knowledge_sourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_messagesno sensitive capability
  • list_modelsno sensitive capability
  • list_phone_numbersno sensitive capability
  • list_scheduled_actionsno sensitive capability
  • list_test_casesno sensitive capability
  • list_test_runsno sensitive capability
  • list_test_suitesno sensitive capability
  • list_voicesno sensitive capability
  • lookup_phone_numberno sensitive capability
  • manage_api_keysno sensitive capability
  • manage_dynamic_variablesno sensitive capability
  • provision_phone_numberno sensitive capability
  • release_phone_numberno sensitive capability
  • run_test_caseno sensitive capability
  • search_phone_numbersno sensitive capability
  • terminate_callno sensitive capability
  • update_agentno sensitive capability
  • update_contactno sensitive capability
  • update_custom_functionno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.1 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-08

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan magpipe-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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