Magector MCP Server
magector
npm
v2.16.18
Source verified
Published by krejcif — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Semantic code search for Magento 2 — index, search, MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/binary.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/binary.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { createReq
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/binary.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: FileSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/init.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'readline'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mcp-server.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: FileSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'readline'; import { createServer as createNetSe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mcp-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/update.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/update.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/update.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/update.js:86`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/magector/latest', { signal: controller.signal, hea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/update.js
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
magento_trace_configreads sensitive dataIndex Statisticsno sensitive capabilitymagento_analyze_diffno sensitive capabilitymagento_ast_searchno sensitive capabilitymagento_batchno sensitive capabilitymagento_complexityno sensitive capabilitymagento_describeno sensitive capabilitymagento_enrichno sensitive capabilitymagento_error_parserno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_apino sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
magento_find_blockno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_callersno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_classno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_configno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_controllerno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_cronno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_dataobject_issuesno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_db_schemano sensitive capabilitymagento_find_di_wiringno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_event_dispatchersno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_event_flowno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_fieldsetno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_graphqlno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_implementorsno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_layoutno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_methodno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_null_risksno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_observerno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_pluginno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_preferenceno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_table_usageno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_templateno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_testno sensitive capabilitymagento_find_triggerno sensitive capabilitymagento_grepno sensitive capabilitymagento_impact_analysisno sensitive capabilitymagento_indexno sensitive capabilitymagento_module_structureno sensitive capabilitymagento_performance_profileno sensitive capabilitymagento_readno sensitive capabilitymagento_searchno sensitive capabilitymagento_statsno sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_apino sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_call_chainno sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_data_flowno sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_dependencyno sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_flowno sensitive capabilitymagento_trace_shipping_chainno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.16.18 latest |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v2.16.15 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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