Macos Ts MCP Server

macos-ts npm v0.15.0 Source verified

Published by evantahler — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

Trust grade
A
97/100
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Trust
A · 97/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 97/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_chat, list_albums]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_chat, list_albums] → sinks [send_message]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_chat → send_message

Tools 28

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_chatingests untrusted input
  • list_albumsingests untrusted input
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • get_albumno sensitive capability
  • get_attachment_urlno sensitive capability
  • get_capabilitiesno sensitive capability
  • get_contactno sensitive capability
  • get_messageno sensitive capability
  • get_photono sensitive capability
  • get_photo_urlno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
  • list_accountsno sensitive capability
  • list_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_chatsno sensitive capability
  • list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_foldersno sensitive capability
  • list_group_membersno sensitive capability
  • list_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_handlesno sensitive capability
  • list_message_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_messagesno sensitive capability
  • list_notesno sensitive capability
  • list_photosno sensitive capability
  • read_noteno sensitive capability
  • read_note_handwritingno sensitive capability
  • search_contactsno sensitive capability
  • search_messagesno sensitive capability
  • search_notesno sensitive capability
  • search_photosno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.15.0 latest A 97/100 1 1.10.0 2026-07-25

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 97/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan macos-ts --online

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