Macos (kartikk-k) MCP Server
macos-mcp
npm
v1.2.2
Published by kartikk-k — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for controlling macOS features (volume, mail) via AppleScript
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×10 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 7 = 78. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/audio/beep.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/audio/beep.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; type SystemSound = | "Basso" | "Blow" | "Bottle" | "Frog" | "Funk"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/audio/beep.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/audio/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/audio/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/audio/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/finder/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/finder/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/finder/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/mail/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/mail/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mail/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/notes/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/notes/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/notes/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/notification/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/notification/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/notification/runAppleScript.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export function runAppleScript(script: string): string { const escaped = scri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/audio/beep.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/audio/beep.ts:28`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: i++) { try { execSync(`afplay "${soundPath}"`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5000 }); } catch (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/audio/beep.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/audio/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/audio/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/audio/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/calendar/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/chrome/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/contacts/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/finder/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/finder/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/finder/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/mail/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/mail/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/mail/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/notes/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/notes/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/notes/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/notification/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/notification/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/notification/runAppleScript.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts:5`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g, "'\"'\"'"); return execSync(`osascript -e '${escaped}'`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 10000 }).trim(); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/reminders/runAppleScript.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.2 latest |
C 78/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan macos-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Macos 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
MCP server for Reminders, Calendar, Notes, Mail, Messages, and Contacts on macOS.
Control macOS system settings, apps, windows, audio, displays, screenshots, and Focus mode via MCP. STDIO or Streamable HTTP.
MCP Server for interacting with macOS Desktop.
Security scan results for the Macos (npm) MCP server.
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