Macos Mail MCP Server
macos-mail-mcp
npm
v1.3.4
Source verified
Published by marius-cetanas — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server connecting Claude to macOS Mail.app via AppleScript
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/bridge/applescript-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/bridge/applescript-runner.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { readFile, writeFile, mkdtemp, rm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/bridge/applescript-runner.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_attachments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, forward_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_attachments] → sinks [send_message, forward_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_attachments → send_message
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
forward_messagenetwork egresslist_attachmentsingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egresscreate_mailboxno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilityflag_messageno sensitive capabilityget_account_detailno sensitive capabilityget_mailbox_infono sensitive capabilityget_messageno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
list_mailboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_messagesno sensitive capabilitymark_readno sensitive capabilitymove_messageno sensitive capabilitymove_messagesno sensitive capabilityread_attachmentno sensitive capabilityreply_to_messageno sensitive capabilitysave_all_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitysave_attachmentno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.3 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.3.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.3.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v1.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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