Machine Bridge MCP Server
machine-bridge-mcp
npm
v2.0.0
Published by yuleifuyun — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Cross-client MCP bridge for local agent context, structured browser and application automation, files, Git, processes, resources, and durable jobs over stdio or OAuth relay.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/local/operation-risk.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/local/operation-risk.mjs:37`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: g", ".kube", ".docker", ".npmrc", ".pypirc", "keychains", "cookies", "login data", "credentials", "secrets", ]); expo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/local/operation-risk.mjs
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/privacy-check.mjs)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/privacy-check.mjs:51`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Path).toLowerCase() === ".npmrc") scanNpmrc(relativePath, text, findings); scanDenylist(relativePath, text, denylist,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/privacy-check.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-runner.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-runner.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { performance } from "node:perf_hooks"; import { BoundedOutput } from "..
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-runner.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/commit-message-check.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/commit-message-check.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import process from "node:process"; const allowedTypes = Object.freeze([ "fea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/commit-message-check.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/coverage-check.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/coverage-check.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/coverage-check.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate-worker-types.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate-worker-types.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate-worker-types.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/github-backlog.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/github-backlog.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/github-backlog.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/github-push.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/github-push.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/github-push.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/github-release.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/github-release.mjs:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { runNetworkCommand } from "./network-retry.mjs"; import { requireSuccess
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/github-release.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/local-release-acceptance.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/local-release-acceptance.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/local-release-acceptance.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/network-retry.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/network-retry.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; const WAIT_BUFFER = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)); const TRANSIENT_N
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/network-retry.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prepare-pinned-npm.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prepare-pinned-npm.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtemp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prepare-pinned-npm.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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