Lxd MCP Server
lxd-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Published by edgeseek — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for LXD container management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "exec_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lxd/api.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lxd/api.js:295`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ec operations async exec(instanceName, command, options = {}, project) { const environment = { '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lxd/api.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lxd/scoped-api.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lxd/scoped-api.js:197`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ct validation async exec(instanceName, command, options, project) { const validatedProject = validateProject
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lxd/scoped-api.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "exec_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool exec_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "exec_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_command
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_commandruns code / shelladd_profile_deviceno sensitive capabilityadd_profile_to_instanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_aliasno sensitive capabilitycreate_instanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_profileno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydelete_aliasno sensitive capabilitydelete_imageno sensitive capabilitydelete_instanceno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
delete_profileno sensitive capabilitydelete_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_aliasno sensitive capabilityget_cluster_infono sensitive capabilityget_imageno sensitive capabilityget_instanceno sensitive capabilityget_instance_stateno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_server_infono sensitive capabilityget_server_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_aliasesno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_instancesno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitylxd_config_getno sensitive capabilitylxd_config_setno sensitive capabilitylxd_config_showno sensitive capabilitylxd_file_pullno sensitive capabilitylxd_file_pushno sensitive capabilitylxd_logsno sensitive capabilitylxd_monitorno sensitive capabilityremove_profile_deviceno sensitive capabilityremove_profile_from_instanceno sensitive capabilityrestart_instanceno sensitive capabilityrestore_snapshotno sensitive capabilityset_profile_configno sensitive capabilityset_profile_deviceno sensitive capabilitystart_instanceno sensitive capabilitystop_instanceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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