Lumina MCP Server
lumina-mcp
npm
v1.4.1
Published by wahyu-labs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Unified MCP toolkit for engineering workflows, database connections, and source control
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:287`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: br,execFile as Tr}from"child_process";import{promisify as je}from"util";var Ue=je(br),ge=je(Tr);async function He(n,e,t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_mysql_queryreads sensitive dataanalyze_postgresql_queryreads sensitive dataexecute_mysql_queryreads sensitive dataexecute_postgres_queryreads sensitive datafix_gitea_pr_reviewingests untrusted inputfix_github_pr_reviewingests untrusted inputget_gitea_pr_diffingests untrusted inputget_github_issueingests untrusted inputget_github_pr_diffingests untrusted inputget_jira_ticketingests untrusted input
Show 22 more tools ↓
get_jira_ticket_commentsingests untrusted inputget_openproject_work_packageingests untrusted inputget_openproject_work_package_commentsingests untrusted inputget_trello_cardingests untrusted inputcreate_gitea_prno sensitive capabilitycreate_github_issueno sensitive capabilitycreate_github_prno sensitive capabilitycreate_jira_ticketno sensitive capabilitycreate_openproject_work_packageno sensitive capabilitycreate_trello_cardno sensitive capabilitygenerate_commit_and_pushno sensitive capabilityget_orchestration_phaseno sensitive capabilityinspect_mysql_tableno sensitive capabilityinspect_postgresql_tableno sensitive capabilitylist_mysql_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_postgresql_tablesno sensitive capabilityreply_to_pr_commentno sensitive capabilityresolve_pr_review_threadno sensitive capabilityreview_gitea_prno sensitive capabilityreview_github_prno sensitive capabilitysave_audit_reportno sensitive capabilitysave_audit_report_pgno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
v1.3.2 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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