Lumenmcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "@lumenlang/lumenmcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@lumenlang/lumenmcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@lumenlang/lumenmcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"file-write",
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: search_examples → get_file_contents → lumen_clear_overrides. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "search_examples → get_file_contents → lumen_clear_overrides"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"search_examples"
],
"sources": [
"get_file_contents",
"list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"lumen_clear_overrides",
"lumen_disable_debug",
"lumen_enable_debug",
"lumen_set_snapshots",
"lumen_get_state"
],
"path": [
"search_examples",
"get_file_contents",
"lumen_clear_overrides"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "search_examples",
"to": "get_file_contents",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "get_file_contents",
"to": "lumen_clear_overrides",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lumen_clear_overrides\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_clear_overrides\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_clear_overrides"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lumen_disable_debug\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_disable_debug\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_disable_debug"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lumen_enable_debug\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_enable_debug\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_enable_debug"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lumen_set_snapshots\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_set_snapshots\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_set_snapshots"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lumen_get_state\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_get_state\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_get_state"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/headless.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/headless.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/headless.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { createInterface } from \"readline\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/headless.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/jre.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/jre.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/jre.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, createWriteStream, readdirSync, statSync, chmodS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/jre.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/docs.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/docs.js:8`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/docs.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch(\"https://lumenlang.dev/Lumen-documentation.ldoc\"); if (!res.ok) throw new Erro",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/docs.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/github.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/github.js:5`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/github.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch(\"https://api.github.com/repos/LumenLang/lumen/git/trees/main?recursive=1\"); if (!res.o",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/github.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/pages.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/pages.js:5`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/pages.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch(\"https://docsapi.vansencool.net/docs/lumen/github/structure\"); if (!res.ok) th",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/pages.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"lumen_clear_overrides\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_clear_overrides\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_clear_overrides",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"lumen_disable_debug\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_disable_debug\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_disable_debug",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"lumen_enable_debug\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_enable_debug\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_enable_debug",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"lumen_set_snapshots\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_set_snapshots\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_set_snapshots",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"lumen_get_state\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_get_state\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_get_state",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lumen_clear_overrides\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_clear_overrides\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_clear_overrides"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lumen_disable_debug\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_disable_debug\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_disable_debug"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lumen_enable_debug\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_enable_debug\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_enable_debug"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lumen_set_snapshots\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_set_snapshots\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_set_snapshots"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lumen_get_state\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lumen_get_state\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lumen_get_state"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"create_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"get_file_contents\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_file_contents\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_file_contents",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"search_examples"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"get_file_contents",
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"lumen_clear_overrides",
"lumen_disable_debug",
"lumen_enable_debug",
"lumen_set_snapshots",
"lumen_get_state"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"search_examples",
"get_file_contents",
"lumen_clear_overrides"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: search_examples → get_file_contents → lumen_clear_overrides."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "lumen_authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_clear_overrides",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_configure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_disable_debug",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_enable_debug",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_override",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_poll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_remove_override",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_set_snapshots",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_execute_snippet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lumen_get_state",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_contents",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_file_contents\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rename_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_closest_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
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