Ludus (NocteDefensor) MCP Server
ludus-mcp
npm
v1.0.24
Published by noctedefensor — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for managing Ludus cybersecurity training environments through natural language commands
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 16.6 = 83. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×10 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 83 − 7 = 76. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 23
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as os from 'os'; import * as path from 'path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { basename } from 'path'; import { creat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export async function downloadBaseConfigs(logger) { const repoUrl = 'https:/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/downloadDocs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadDocs.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export async function downloadLudusDocumentation(logger) { const repoUrl = '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadDocs.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; export async function downloadSchemas(logger) { const repoUrl = 'https://git
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/secretDialog.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/secretDialog.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as os from 'os'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/secretDialog.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as os from 'os'; import * as path from 'pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, basename } from 'path'; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ludusMCP/interactiveSetup.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { Logger } from './logger.js'; export async function downloadBaseConf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/downloadDocs.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadDocs.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { Logger } from './logger.js'; export async function downloadLudusDoc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadDocs.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js:129`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://docs.ludus.cloud/schemas/range-config.json'); if (!response.ok) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts:175`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://docs.ludus.cloud/schemas/range-config.json'); if (!response.ok) { thr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js:873`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`${pingCommand} ${pingArgs.join(' ')}`, { encoding: 'utf-8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js:52`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ub repository...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}"`, { stdio: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/downloadDocs.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadDocs.js:20`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: epository...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}"`, { stdio: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadDocs.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js:117`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (main branch)...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 --branch main "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/downloadSchemas.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/secretDialog.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/secretDialog.js:108`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${tempFile}"`, { encoding: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/secretDialog.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts:975`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`${pingCommand} ${pingArgs.join(' ')}`, { encoding: 'utf-8', timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ludusMCP/cliWrapper.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts:69`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Hub repository...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}"`, { stdio: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadBaseConfigs.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/utils/downloadDocs.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadDocs.ts:26`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: b repository...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}"`, { stdio: '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadDocs.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts:158`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (main branch)...'); execSync(`git clone --filter=blob:none --sparse --depth 1 --branch main "${repoUrl}" "${tempDir}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/downloadSchemas.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/utils/secretDialog.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/secretDialog.ts:134`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${tempFile}"`, { encoding: 'utf8',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/secretDialog.ts
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"ludus-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: npm run build
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package ludus-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.24 latest |
C 76/100 | 23 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ludus-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Ludus 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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